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I. INTRODUCTION

"Three strikes and you're out" may be good baseball. In 1994,
however, it turned out to be a case study of sound bite electioneering, substituting for careful analysis of complex social and penological problems.
In 1992 Mike Reynolds, father of murder victim Kimber Reynolds,1 began a campaign to secure passage of one of the nation's
2
most draconian multiple-offender statutes. When Reynolds first
proposed "three strikes" to the legislature, the Assembly Public
3
Safety Committee soundly defeated the bill. Reynolds's subsequent
efforts may have failed but for the kidnapping and murder of
4
twelve-year-old Polly Klaas, whose plight galvanized the nation.
Richard Allen Davis, Polly's admitted killer and a repeat offender, symbolized the failure of the criminal justice system; Polly's
1. See George Skelton, A Father's Crusade Born from Pain, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9,
1993, at A3. Convicted felon Joe Davis shot and killed Kimber Reynolds when she
resisted him after he attempted to take her purse. See id.
2. See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395, 400-01 & nn.25-36 & app. A (1997) (detailing the
provisions of various state habitual offender statutes). Six of the 22 states that have
enacted "three-strikes" laws have had no convictions, while California's stringent law
has led to the imprisonment of 15,000 offenders. See Only California Using '3
Strikes' Law Widely, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 10, 1996, at A3. The California law
considers any of the state's 500 felonies-both violent and nonviolent-as a third
strike. See id. A University of Wisconsin study found that 85% of the second- and
third-strike convictions were for nonviolent offenses. See id.
"Three strikes" is used in this Article to describe both the statute adopted by
the legislature, Act of Mar. 7, 1994, ch. 12, 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. 56 (West)
(amending CAL PENAL CODE § 667), and the voter initiative, Proposition 184, in
California Ballot Pamphlet, General Election, Nov. 8, 1994 (hereinafter California
Ballot Pamphlet] (codified at CAL PENAL CODE§ 1170.12 (West Supp. 1997)). Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references in the text are to the California Penal
Code.
There is some debate whether the two provisions are identical. For example,
at least one trial court found significance in minor variation in the language of the
two laws. See People v. Hazelton, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 730,731-32 (1995) (reversing trial
court's ruling that the voter initiative differed from the legislative version in the context of extra-jurisdictional prior convictions), review granted and opinion superseded,
_Cal. 4th_, 911 P.2d 429,50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242 (1996), affd, 14 Cal. 4th 101 , 926
P.2d 423,58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443 (1996).
3. See Skelton, supra note 1, at A3.
4. See infra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
5. Richard Allen Davis's rap sheet was eleven pages long, including two prior
kidnapping convictions. See Richard Price, Town Angry ac a Syscem that Failed,
USA TODAY, Dec. 8, 1993, at 1A. In his most recent stay in prison-a 16-year sentence for kidnapping, assault, and burglary-he had served only half of his sentence
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death was a critical moment for "three strikes."6 Within days of reports of her murder, "three strikes" gathered 50,000 signatures and
was on its way to becoming the fastest qualifying voter initiative in
7
California history. The public's support for the "three-strikes" initiative assured new interest in the legislature when the bill's propo8
nents resubmitted it.
9
From the inception of "three strikes," commentators along a
before early release for good behavior. See id. Davis would have been in jail on the
day Polly Klaas was abducted if he had served his entire sentence. See id. at lA.
6. If there was any doubt about the intensity of the anger at Davis, Governor
Pete Wilson's loss of control during an interview with a reporter was telling. Wilson
said: "I mean, when I think of that son of a bitch, you cannot help but be angered.
Did you see the picture of him on the front page of the [San Francisco] Chronicle?
Smirking? Jesus, boy. I wanted to just belt him right across the mouth." George
Skelton, Wilson Seizes the Day After Polly's Murder, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1993, at
A3. After the arrest politicians scurried to respond to the fears of their constituencies. See Dan Morain, A Father's Bittersweet Crusade, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1994, at
Al. Mike Reynolds's growing initiative was the perfect answer. His initiative, had it
been prior law, would have kept Richard Allen Davis in prison. See Price, supra
note 5, at 1A. The phrase "three strikes and you're out" was the perfect sound bite
for legislators anxious to capitalize on the publicized murder of Polly Klaas. See Morain, supra, at A 1.
7. See Richard Kelly Heft, Legislating with a Vengeance, INDEPENDENT
{LONDON), Apr. 26, 1995, at 27.
8. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
9. The legislative intent in enacting "three strikes" was to "ensure longer prison
sentences and greater punishment" for those who have committed prior felonies.
CAL PENAL CODE§ 667{b) (West Supp. 1997).
By enacting " three strikes" the legislature has mandated longer sentences as
follows: the law eliminates limitations on aggregate terms of imprisonment, see id. §
667(c)(1); see also id. § 1170.12(a)(1) (codifying the analogous provision of the voter
initiative); amended section 667 prohibits probation for second- or third-time felons
within its provisions, see id. § 667(c)(2); see also id. § 1170.12(a)(2) (voter initiative);
and the law withdraws judicial discretion to have offenders covered by its provisions
committed to diversion programs or to the California Rehabilitation Center, see id. §
667(c)(4); see also id. § 1 170.12(a)(4) (voter initiative); further, it reduces the amount
of good-time credits that may be awarded to a maximum of one-fifth the total term
of the imposed sentence, see id. § 667(c)(5); see also id. § 1170.12(a)(5) (voter initiative); and requires courts to sentence certain defendants to consecutive, rather than
concurrent, terms of imprisonment, see id. § 667(c)(6)-(8); see also id. §
1170.12(a)(6)-(8) (voter initiative).
Several other key provisions demonstrate the commitment to long terms of
imprisonment for a wide array of criminal defendants. Subsection 667(c)(3) provides
that " [t]he length of time between the prior felony conviction and the current felony
.conviction shall not affect the imposition of sentence." /d. § 667(c)(3); see also id. §
1170.12(a)(3) (voter initiative). That is, there is no ·'wash-out" period, leaving older
offenders liable for violent or serious felonies committed during the height of their
criminal careers.
Subsections 667(d), (e), and (f) include the key provisions of the "threestrikes" legislation. Subsection (d) identifies what is colloquially called a "strike."
See id. § 667(d); see also id. § 1170.12(b) (voter initiative). Specifically, subsection
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11

able majorities in both houses, and Californians voted in favor of
12
the initiative in overwhelming numbers.
Critics focused on numerous issues, some related to technical
13
drafting problems. But commentators also identified two substantial state constitutional problems with both the legislation and the
initiative. First, subsection 667(e)(2)(A), the law's most controversial provision, targets a defendant who has committed two prior
"violent" or "serious" felonies; when charged with a third felony, the
defendant must be sentenced to a minimum term of twenty-five
14
years to life. Critics argued that because the third "strike" may be
any felony, punishments under the law may violate the state consti15
tutional prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment.
Second, critics questioned the balance of power between the
judge and prosecutor under "three strikes." Typical sentencing
schemes give judges some discretion, allowing them to avoid excessive sentences. "Three strikes" was different. Despite seeking the
16
assistance of a state appellate court judge in drafting the legislation,
Lawyers to Shun Plea Bargains, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1994, at Al. One Los Angeles
Superior Court judge gave an insightful summary of the general disdain toward
"three strikes": "I've never seen something before where D.A.s, defense lawyers
and judges agree. This thing is not working.... I've been a Republican all my life,
and I' m afraid I'm starting to sound like a Democrat." Jill Smolowe, Going Soft on
Crime, TIME, Nov. 14, 1994, at 63, 63.
11. Assembly Bill 971 (A.B. 971) passed the Assembly by a 63-9 margin on
January 31, 1994. See 1 ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY, 712 {Cal. 1993-1994 Reg. Sess.).
The Senate passed it by a 29-7 margin on March 3,1994. See id.
12. Proposition 184, the "three-strikes" ballot initiative, received 72% of the
vote. See State Propositions, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 10, 1994, at B4.
13. See, e.g., William M. Thornbury, What Is the Meaning of Three Strikes and
You Are Out Legislation?, 26 U. WEST L.A. L. REv. 303 (1995) (noting the poor
draftsmanship of the legislation and discussing its numerous ambiguities). For an
objective description of the technical deficiencies of the "three-strikes" initiative, see
GRACE LIDIA SUAREZ, SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC DEFENDER'S GUIDE TO THREE
STRIKES {1994).
14. See CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667(e)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
15. The California judiciary came to a consensus in this regard at a 1994 California Judges Association seminar. At the convention judges agreed that some sentences under the provisions of "three strikes" would be struck down as cruel and unusual punishment. See Scott Graham, Trial Judges Trying to Determine Their Role in
'Three Strikes' Cases, RECORDER (San Francisco), Sept. 27, 1994, at 3; see also Albert
J. Menaster, Eighteen Ways to Avoid Three Strikes, 26 U. WEST L.A. L. REv. 283,
299-301 (1995) (arguing that the " three-strikes" statute is cruel and unusual both per
se and as applied).
16. Judge James A. Ardaiz, presiding justice of the Fifth District Court of Appeal_, and two other Fresno Municipal Court judges cooperated in drafting an initial
outhne of the " three-strikes" measure. See Dan Morain, Judge Admits His Role in '3
Strikes' Law, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at A3.
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Reynolds distrusted judges even more than he distrusted legislators.17 "Three strikes" was drafted to eliminate judicial discretion
while allowing a prosecutor to refuse to follow the sentencing provisions "in the furtherance of justice."18
Although not without ambiguity,19 the law placed a judge in a
difficult position: if the judge believed that a prior conviction should
be "struck" in the interest of justice, the judge could do so only upon
motion of the prosecutor. Based on a line of cases beginning in

17. In an article addressing the recent California Supreme Court's decision in
Romero-returning discretion to the judiciary in "three-strikes" cases-Mike Reynolds, leery of the judicial system, suggested that a list of specific conditions under
which a judge may strike a prior conviction be established in order to restrict judicial
discretion. See Daniel M. Weintraub, Pringle Out to Restore '3 Strikes', ORANGE
COUNTY REG., June 21 , 1996, at Al. Reynolds stated that "[t]hen what you've done
is painted the judges into a box. But it has to be a pretty tight box. These guys are
crafty. If you leave a crack in the door they'll drive a truck through it." /d.
18. CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 667(f)(2), 1170.12(d) (West Supp. 1997) (providing that
a prosecuting attorney may strike a prior felony conviction in the furtherance of justice pursuant to section 1385 of the California Penal Code).
In analyzing the provisions of "three strikes," the California Senate Judiciary
Committee noted some of the constitutional problems of A.B. 971 and concluded
that in some cases "three strikes" would, in fact, impose cruel and unusual punishment. See CALIFORNIA SENATE JUDICIARY COMM. ANALYSJS OF A.B. 971, 1993-1994
Reg. Sess. 8 (Feb. 17, 1994) (visited Mar. 15, 1997) <http://www.leginfo.
ca.gov/pub/93-94/bill/asrnlab_0951-1000/ab_971_cfa_940210_160740_sen_comm>
(hereinafter SENATE JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971). Nevertheless, the purpose
behind subsection 667(f)(2) was to remove judicial discretion. The appellate justices
in Romero expounded on the legislative purpose of this provision and noted that
" the clear intent of the electorate was to limit the power of the court." People v. Superior Court (Romero) , 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 377 (Ct. App. 1995), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 13 Cal. 4th 497, 917 P.2d 628, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789 (1996). The appellate
court further recognized the electorate's indignation with the "judicial system's revolving door" and noted that the proponents' ballot argument claimed that the
measure was brought to the voters as a reaction to "soft-on-crime judges" who
"spend all of their time looking for loopholes" to reduce punishment for defendants.
/d.

19. Confronted with the issue of whether section 667 of the California Penal
Code empowers the court to strike prior felon y allegations on its own motion pursuant to section 1385 of the California Penal Code, the California Supreme Court
wrote a 43-page opinion in which it concluded, in part, that the ambiguity of the
statute-which does not expressly prohibit trial courts from exercising their traditional power to strike prior felony convictions pursuant to section 1385-in and of
itself prohibits elimination of judicial discretion in this regard. See Romero, 13 Cal.
4th at 517-22, 917 P.2d at 639-48, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 801-09; see also id. at 522, 917
P.2d at 642, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803 ("The drafter's express invocation of section 1385
in the Three Strikes law, together with the absence of any language purporting to bar
courts from acting pursuant to it, virtually compels the conclusion no such prohibition was intended."). But see infra notes 319-20 and accompanying text (doubting
Romero's statutory construction).

June 1997]

"THREE STRIKES" AND THE ROMERO CASE

1649

0

1970,~ critics argu~d that subsection 6.67q~(2) violated the state con-

stitutiOnal separatiOn-of-powers doctnne.
Critics of "three strikes" proved to be right on at least one
count. On June 20, 1996, the California Supreme Court held that
22
subsection 667(f)(2) did not eliminate judicial discretion. Desgite a
unanimous decision in People v. Superior Court (Romero), the
24
court's statutory construction is certainly open to question. More
importantly, six justices agreed that had the legislature denied
judges' discretion, the statute would violate the separation-of. 25
powers doctnne.
Public reaction to Romero is mixed. While some commentators
praise the decision, 26 many target the court for undermining the will

20. See People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d 89, 473 P.2d 993,89 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1970).
21 . Trial court judge William Mudd, who in the face of a newly enacted '·threestrikes" law insisted on striking Romero's prior felony convictions sua sponte, rendered a principled decision based on precedent established by cases such as Tenorio.
"Judges are the conscience of the community," said Judge Mudd, " and should be
free to evaluate what type of sanction is appropriate." Anne Krueger, State High
Court to Rule on '3 Strikes', SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 31, 1996, at Al. At
Romero's sentencing hearing, Judge Mudd wrote the following: "I think this is a
significant piece of Legislation that basically castrates a judge. It takes away all of
the discretion and it places it squarely in the hands of the D.A. and that's the reason
it's a separation-of-powers argument." Romero, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 371. Several
other trial court judges followed the same line of reasoning to strike prior felony
convictions. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (O'Donnell), 49 Cal. App. 4th 194,47
Cal. Rptr. 333 (1995) (vacating trial court's decision to strike a prior felony conviction to render defendant eligible for parole); People v. Petty, 46 Cal. App. 4th 723,
44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34 (1995) (holding that the "three-strikes" provision did not give
trial court power to dismiss serious felony obligations); People v. Glaster, 45 Cal.
App. 4th 299, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65 (1995) (reversing trial court's decision to strike a
prior felony) .
22. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 529-30, 917 P.2d at 647, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 808.
23. 13 Cal. 4th 497,917 P.2d 628, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789 (1996).
24. See infra notes 318-21 and accompanying text.
25. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 513-17,917 P.2d at 636-39,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797800.
26. "'The mindless and inexorable demand for a life sentence for minor offenses
has become a bit more mindful."' Carey Goldberg, California Judges Ease 3-Strike
Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 21 , 1996, at A1 (quoting Vincent Schiraldi, Executive Director, Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice). One reporter noted that "OJudicial
discretion provides a safety valve, for defendants and for society. The law shouldn't
be a cliche that divides people; it should be an expression of our collective will, reasonably enforced." Remodeling '3 Strikes', S.F. EXAMINER, June 23, 1996, at BlO.
Notably concise, the ACLU stated that "'[i]f you take sentencing discretion away
from a judge, you may as well use a computer."' Tom Rhodes, 'Three-Strikes' Law
Ruled Illegal by California Court, TIMES (London), June 22, 1996, at 16 (quoting
Ramona Ripston, ACLU).
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of the people. 27 During hearings on proposed amendments to "three
strikes" that would narrow judicial discretion, for example, some
witnesses and legislators sugiested that liberal judges are at the root
of society's crime problem. As observed by one commentator,
"three strikes" "came about because the judiciary dictated too much
leniency toward criminals. " 29
30
The court's critics also attacked Romero as antidemocratic.
Like frequent conservative criticism of the United States Supreme
Court,31 commentators have lambasted the court for frustrating the
will of the people. Typical is the statement of one writer that
"[Romero] is another blow to a core principle of democracy-rule
by the people(; Romero] ... limit[s] the power of the people in favor
27. Several commentators fervently argue that the judiciary should not interfere
with the will of the people in cases where the legislation does not conflict with constitutionally guaranteed rights. One reporter wrote that " Uudges) should either administer [the law] or find new jobs, perhaps in the Legislature, where they could pursue
their legislating goals." David Kline, High Court Delivers a Wild Pitch Against Three
Strikes, CAPITOL NEWS SERVICE, June 24, 1996, at 11, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File. "The court's decision is a bad one," he continued, "and not just
because it ignores the will of the people. . . . [T)he ruling represents an attempt by
the supreme court to seize law-making authority from the legislative branch." /d.
California's Secretary of State, Bill Jones, responded with disdain to the Romero decision and accused the judiciary of preserving its own territory at the expense of Californians. " In publishing their decision," he stated, "the justices showed they are
more interested in protecting the turf of the bench than they are in protecting the
safety of Californians." Bill Ainsworth, Senate GOP Leader Urges Justices' Ouster,
RECORDER (San Francisco), June 21, 1996, at 1.
28. Senate Minority Leader Rob Hurtt advanced such a position at an Assembly
Public Safety Committee hearing in which he stated that " he wants to eliminate the
'horrifying reality that liberal judges can resume their practice of failing to get tough
on career criminals,"' and that " recidivists can go shopping for liberal judges." John
Jacobs, More Posturing on Three Strikes, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 30, 1996, at F4.
During this same hearing, Reynolds asserted that but for a liberal judge's sentencing
decision, Richard Allen Davis would have been in prison at the time he killed Polly
Klaas. See Letter from J. Charles Kelso, Director, Institute for Legislative Practice,
McGeorge School of Law, to Michael Vitiello (June 30, 1996) (on file with the Loyola of L os Angeles Law Review). The prosecutor who handled the earlier case
against Davis corrected Reynolds, explaining that the judge sentenced Davis to a
maximum term and that Davis was released because of good-time credits. See id.
29. Steven Lawrence, Three Strikes, The People Are Out, RECORDER (San Francisco), June 26, 1996, at 4.
30. "Once again, democracy is thwarted. The people have spoken, and judges
have thwarted their will." African-Americans Slam California Supreme Court for
Elitist Interpretation of 'Three Strikes, You 're Out,' PR NEWSWIRE, June 21, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File [hereinafter Elitist Interpretation]
(quoting a member of Project 21, an African-American leadership group).
31. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 130 (1990)
(commenting that for the past half-ce ntury the United States Supreme Court has invariably legislated items on the liberal agenda).
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32

of rule by judges, the philosopher kings. "
The criticism is unfortunate and unfounded. Politicians frequently engage in court-bashing, contributing to cynicism about an
34
important public institution.33 Constrained by ethical rules, judges
are not in a position to fight back. Lawyers ahd law professors, who
otherwise share similar institutional values, are often among the
35
loudest critics.
32. Lawrence, supra note 29, at 4.
33. "It's time to get the liberal judges out of there," stated a member of Project
21 , an African-American leadership group. Elitist Interpretation, supra note 30. "We
need judges who will fight for the people and not the liberal elite. This country is
built on 'We the people' not 'we the judges, we the criminals."' /d.; see also Gilbert
S. Merritt, Judge-Bashing Only Undermines Public Confidence in Judiciary,
NASHVILLE BANNER, July 3, 1996, at A 11 (Chief Judge Merritt, United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, noting some of the frequent criticisms hurled at the
judiciary: judges are "soft on crime," "against the death penalty," "corruptly protecting criminals," "losing the war on drugs," and " refusing to protect citizens against
violence").
Public confidence in the judiciary is the touchstone of judicial independence,
and continued denigration of the system undermines this confidence and weakens
the shield that protects Americans from the tyranny of the majority. The tendency
for politicians to jump on the bandwagon and engage in judge-bashing may be attributed to the public's growing distrust of the judiciary. Chief Judge Merritt noted
that "[t]he distrust index is up, and it is clear that the public is now down on the judiciary .... Polls tell politicians that the public lacks confidence in judges. So politicians attack judges because they think that is where the votes are." /d. The Romero
decision, in particular, brought about an abundance of political criticism of the judiciary. Governor Wilson, who appointed the judge who wrote the Romero opinion,
stated that "'[w]e cannot tolerate a situation which permits judges who are philosophically unsympathetic or politically disinclined to 'three strikes' to reduce the
strong sentences that the voters intended to impose on habitual criminals."' Rhodes,
supra note 26, at 16 (quoting Governor Pete Wilson). He further stated that the decision was "potentially dangerous to public safety." Jd. Senator Quentin L. Kopp
(Ind.-San Francisco) noted the importance of an independent judiciary and expressed, in this regard, that "[s}ome of these statements by the executive and legislative leaders, who ought to know their civics better, are unworthy of them and their
offices, and they're damaging to our democracy .... They're threatening the judiciary." Greg Krikorian & Dan Morain, State GOP Opens Drive to Thwart '3 Strikes'
Ruling, L.A. TIMES, June 22,1996, at Al.
34. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct permits a judge to discuss the law, the
legal system, or the administration of justice subject to the requirements of the Code.
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4B (1990). The Code requires that
a judge must "respect and comply with the law and ... act at all times in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
/d. at Canon 2A. If judges were to publicly attack those critical of their decisions,
such behavior could put judges' impartiality in question. See, e.g., In re Schenck, 870
P.2d 185 (Or. 1994).
35. Legal scholarship, for example, often focuses on the inadequacies of judicial
decisions. See Robert L. Bard, Legal Scholarship and the Professional Responsibility
of Law Professors, 16CONN. L. REv. 731 , 738-39 (1984).
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Far from an attack on democracy, Romero demonstrates why
we need independent judges. The claim that Romero has frustrated
the will of the people is simply wrong. This Article reviews the passage of the "three-strikes" law and argues that democracy failed. 36
"Three strikes" passed as a result of public panic, flamed by politicians who spumed rational debate.3 Powerful lobbying groups,
beneficiaries of "get tough on crime" legislation, actively supported
"three strikes. "38 A number of politicians had doubts about the efficacy of "three strikes"; few were willing to slow its course through
the legislature.39 While many tout the initiative process as democ40
racy in action, politicians' extravagant rhetoric prevented the electorate from making a fully informed decision on "three strikes." For
example, political maneuvering prevented a less draconian alterna41
tive from appearing on the ballot. Proposition 184's proponents
were also able to publish misleading information about its provisions
as part of the initiative process.42
Reliance on the initiative process makes reform of bad legisla43
tion difficult. No doubt that was the intent of its supporters. Re36. See infra Part II.A-8.
37. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 106-22 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 144-77 and accompanying text.
40. For example, the Republican Office of Assembly Research published a pamphlet supporting the ·'three-strikes" measure, stating that
[o]nly when we formulate our punishments on the basis of what is just and
eq uitable is there a role for the democratic process. . . . In the case of crime
legislation in 1994, California's citize ns recognized the outrageous d isproportion between crimes and p unishments; they participated in the democratic process to effect the appropriate changes.
Last year's anti-crime measures did much to restore the principle of democracy to its rightful place in o ur state 's criminal-justice system.
RONALD J. PESTRITIO, JR. , CAL LEGISLATURE, REPUBLICAN OFFICE OF ASSEMBLY
RESEARCH, IN D EFENSE OF THREE-STRIKES: ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF CALI·
FORNIA'S 1994 ANTI-CRIME MEASURES 13.
41. See infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 202-49 and accompanying text.
43. Reynolds went forward with his initiative because he was afraid one of the
competing measures would supersede A.B. 971. T he competing bills could have replaced A .B. 971 if they received Wilson's subsequent signature, but such an occurrence was improbable. Another reason Reynolds pushed forward was to make it
more difficult to "water down" the legislation with subsequent amendments. See
Dana Wilkie, Senate OKs Tough '3 Strikes', SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 4, 1994,
at Al. The initiative expressly provided for legislative amendment, but only by a
two-thirds majority in each house. See CAL. CONST. art. 2, l:i lO(c) (prohibiting legislative amendments to a voter initiative unless the amendment itself is approved by
the voters, or the o riginal initiative provides otherwise); CAL. PENAL Code § 667 G)
(West Supp. 1977). Relying on the initiative process, however, did no t bolster the
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quiring a supermajority for amendment of "three strikes" almost
44
guaranteed that future reform efforts would fail. This Article argues that Romero was faithful to both precedent and principle, and
that by following principle the court has given California the oppor45
tunity to correct its excesses. Rather than frustrating democracy,
the court has given the legislature an ofportunity to bring rationality
back to California's sentencing policy.
II. "THREE STRIKES" BECOMES LAW
On June 29, 1992, convicted felon Joe Davis tried to grab Kimber Reynolds's purse.47 In the words of her father, Fresno photographer Mike Reynolds, "[s]he resisted, but not that much. It wasn't a
big struggle. He pulled a .357 magnum out of his waistband, stuck it
48
in her ear and pulled the trigger. " Kimber Reynolds died twenty4
six hours later.
Shortly after the murder, Mike Reynolds told Governor Pete
Wilson, "I'm going after these guys in a big way, the kind of people
who would murder little girls in this way. " 50 Reynolds could not
have imagined what an effect he would have on California and the
nation.51
immunity of " three strikes" to subsequent amendment because A .B. 971 already
contained a provision which prohibited amendments except by a two-thirds vote by
the legislature. See id.
44. Subsection 667U) of the California Penal Code limits the legislature's ability
to correct the law's excesses as it requires that all amendments be supported by a
two-thirds vote of each house. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667U). As long as crime remains an important political issue, few politicians will be able to urge reform. Securing a two-thirds majority in the Republican-controlled Assembly is highly unlikely.
Even in the Senate, where Democrats are still in the majority, reform is dubious.
Democrats do not have the requisite votes without some Republican support. Of
course, this assumes that all Democrats would vote for reform, an unlikely assumption.
45. See infra notes 322-78 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 356-78 and accompanying text.
47. See Skelton, supra note 1, at A3.
48. /d. Joe Davis shot and killed Kimber Reynolds in front of at least 24 witnesses. See id.
49. See id.
50. Morain, supra note 6, at Al.
51. Since 1993 at least 23 states have either enacted "three-strikes" statutes or
have amended existing habitual offender statutes to require harsher punishment and
less leniency for defendants. For a list of the habitual offender statutes enacted since
1993, see Vitiello, supra note 2, app. A.
. What distinguishes California from other states is the legislation's severe sentencmg scheme and de nial of judicial discretion. Although the Romero decision restored some of the judiciary's sentencing discretion, the fact that California's " three-

1654

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:1643

Reynolds solicited the assistance of James Ardaiz, the presiding
justice for the California Fifth District Court of Appeal, in drafting
the original " three-strikes" legislation. 52 In 1993 Reynolds prevailed
on Bill Jones, then a Republican assemblyman from Fresno, to
sponsor Assembly Bill 971 (A.B. 971).53 Jones enlisted Democratic
Assemblyman Jim Costa for support in the then Democratically
54
controlled legislature.
On April 20, 1993, Reynolds and four busloads of supporters
showed up for the first hearing on the bill before the Assembly Public Safety Committee. 55 After Reynolds's impassioned plea for
stiffer sanctions for habitual offenders, the Committee soundly de6
feated the bill. 5 The Assembly's inaction forced Reynolds to tum to
strikes" provision is triggered by any third felony-violent or nonviolent-makes it
one of the most extreme laws of its kind. See id. at nn.25-36.
52. See Morain, supra note 16, at A3. Two other Fresno Municipal Court judges
cooperated with Judge Ardaiz in drafting an initial outline of the "three-strikes"
measure. See id. While it would appear that Mike Reynolds would have wanted to
use judicial authorship as a selling point, he did not reveal the authors until October
1994. See Dan Morain, Sponsor Says Judges Helped Write '3 Strikes', L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 1994, at A3. During a debate in San Francisco, Reynolds was challenged to
reveal the ide ntity of the authors of "three strikes." See id. Vincent Schiraldi, the
director of the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice in San Francisco and an outspoken critic of "three strikes," made an unfounded accusation that the National Rifle Association (NRA) had authored the bill. See id. In response, Reynolds said,
" I'm going to tell you who was responsible for this.... They were judges that did
the actual pen to paper, the initial draft." /d. Reynolds also said that the measure
was then circulated among deputies in the state Attorney General's office. See id.
Reynolds refused to name the judges and stated that the judges had requested anonymity. See id. The reason they wanted to remain anonymous, according to Reynolds, was because they may need to " rule on a 'three strikes' case and they didn 't
want to [be] placed in a position of partiality." /d.
Judge Ardaiz admitted his involvement in response to the publicity over the
drafting and sharp criticism from other judges, who suggested that the judicial canon
of ethics required coming forward. See Morain, supra note 16, at A3. Questions
were raised on whether participation in drafting legislation was violative of the judicial responsibility to forego the practice of law. See id. One appellate justice criticized Ardaiz's involvement as " being very pro-law enforcement." /d. The judge also
received criticism from Catherine Campbell, the organizer of a May 1994 forum on
" three strikes," on which Ardaiz was a panelist. She described Ardaiz as an
"outright advocate" of the measure, but the judge responded that nothing he said
amounted to an endorsement. /d. Ardaiz further stated that he had intended to recuse himself from appeals involving "substantive" legal questions regarding the
measure. See id. In defense of his action of drafting "three strikes," Ardaiz said
only, " I want to see [California] be a better place to live." /d.
53. See Phil Wyman & John G . Schmidt, Jr., Three Strikes You 're Out (It's About
Time) , 26 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 249,253 (1995).
54. See id.
55. See Morain, supra note 6, at A 1.
56. See id.
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57

the initiative process to bypass the legislature.
Qualifying an initiative is no mean feat, requiring collection of
58
nearly 385,000 signatures.
Reynolds received financial support
from the National Rifle Association (NRA) and the California Cor59
rectional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA). Even with that
backing, Reynolds could not have succeeded but for Polly Klaas's
60
kidnapping on October 1, 1993.
Before Polly's death was discovered, the efforts of her family to
locate her galvanized the nation. Her parents were able to humanize Polly by getting a videotape of her into the public spotlight.61
The~ formed the Polly Klaas Foundation to keep her in the public
eye. 2 That organization was able to channel efforts of innumerable
63
volunteers.
Millions of Californians were outraged when they learned that
64
her admitted killer, Richard Allen Davis, was a repeat offender.
65
That fact may have assured passage of "three strikes. "
Shortly after Polly's murder was discovered, Reynolds showed

57. See id. In disgust, Reynolds stated: "They figured they'd listen to me, pat me
on the head, say, ' I'm sorry about your daughter,' and send me home. " /d.
58. See CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 8(b) (requiring signatures equal in number to 5% of
the "votes for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial e lection" to certify a petition for placement on the ballot).
59. See Tupper Hull, A Father's Crusade to Lock Up Criminals, S.F. EXAMINER,
Dec. 8, 1993, at Al. Reynolds also reportedly placed his life savings of $60,000 in the
"Three Strikes and You're Out" kitty. See Amy Wallace, Unz TV Ad Says Wilson
Failed L.A. During Riots, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1994, at A3; Dana Wilkie, Three
Strikes and You're Out: Felons Face a Hardened Public Attitude, SAN DIEGO UNION·
TRIB., Feb. 6, 1994, at Al. Reynolds's personal investment was augmented originally
by a $40,000 donation from the NRA. See Hull, supra, at Al. Prior to the murder of
Polly Klaas, the most significant other financial support came from the CCPOA,
which made a $51,000 donation. See id.
60. See Heft, sup ra note 7, at 27.
61. See Jo hn Carman, Why Polly Was So Special, ORLANDO SENTINEL, D ec. 9,
1993, at A1 9.
62. See id.
. 63. See id. Having responded immediately after Polly's abduction by getting
~·d~otape of her into the public spotlight, he r parents prevented Polly from becommg JUSt another girl on a milk carton. See id. Their strategy was to saturate our living rooms with Polly's youthful charm. See id. The volunteer efforts of the Foundation were successful by all accounts, except in the final result. See id.
64. See supra note 5.
65. California State Senator Phil Wyman contended that but for Polly Klaas's
murder by Richard Allen Davis-a recidivist by all counts-the Assembly Public
~afet~ Committee, described by Senator Wyman as the "graveyard of criminal justice bills," would have let the " three-strikes" measure die. See Wyman & Schmidt,
supra note 53, at 253 n.22.
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66

up at the Polly Klaas Foundation with ballot petitions. He introduced himself to Marc Klaas, Polly's father, as "the father of a mur67
dered daughter. " Klaas immediately signed the petition and, for a
time, joined Reynolds's campaign. 68 It was not lost on Klaas or the
public that, had "three strikes" been in place when Davis committed
his last felony, he would have been in prison at the time of Polly's
69
murder.
Despite weeks of campaigning, Reynolds had collected only
20,000 signatures for the initiative prior to the news of Polly's
death. 70 Within days of the reports of her murder, "three-strikes"
supporters had gathered 50,000 signatures and the initiative was on
its way to becoming the fastest qualifying voter initiative in Califor. history. 71 .
ma
Reynolds's Sway with the Legislature and Governor
After Polly Klaas's death, Reynolds's reception in the legislature was decidedly different from the response only months earlier.
The Klaas murder and public perception that crime was on the rise
created overwhelming popular support for tough anticrime legislation.72 Reynolds gave the legislature a choice: pass A.B. 971 or the
voters will do it for you. In an election year, Reynolds had the legisA.

66. See Peter Hecht, Two Grieving Fathers Part Ways on '3 Strikes' Crusade,
SACRAMENTO BEE, July 10,1994, at Al.
67. /d.
68. See id.
69. The media fanned the political flame by accusing politicians of having failed
the electorate in refusing to pass the " three-strikes" measure proposed by Mike
Reynolds in 1993. Talk show hosts proclaimed that "'the blood of Polly Klaas' is on
the hands of the committee members [who killed the bill]." Eric Bailey, Assembly
Public Safety Committee Turns Tough, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1994, at A3.
70. See Heft, supra note 7, at 27.
71. See id.
72. The coordination of Reynolds's efforts and Polly Klaas's death led to a tone
decidedly different from that of the politicians who had only months before rejected
A.B. 971. Bruce Cain, a University of California, Berkeley professor who specializes
in California politics, described the upturn for " three strikes." He said: "A dramatic
event has to coincide with a huge consensus out there. There was a big consensus.
Remember, we're in an election year. That is going to quicken the pace of any idea.
It's a matter of timing." Morain, supra note 6, at Al. The mixture of Polly Klaas's
murder, public perception that crime was on the rise, and election year rhetoric was
the potion that Mike Reynolds and his backers used to put the legislature under a
spell. Mike Reynolds harnessed the fears and frustration of an electorate ready for a
widespread overhaul of politics-as-usual and at once became California's new guru
of criminal justice policy.
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73

lature's attentiOn.
Prior to the passage of A.B. 971, a variety of observers with
widely different political agendas highlighted the bill's draftin~
4
flaws. Reynolds, however, refused to allow amendments to the bill.
Further, Reynolds's sway with the legislature was almost unprecedented. As one commentator observed, '"[t]o argue against a policy
position offered by [Reynolds~ is somehow taken to be a denial of
the legitimacy of [his] pain."' 5 Reynolds was especially adept in
using the press to intimidate those who raised questions about the
legislation. Reynolds's jud9,ment that a politician was soft on crime
6
promised to be devastating.
A number of legislators presented alternative proposals to A.B.
971. 77 Reynolds's own advisers suggested revisions of A.B. 971 that
would have narrowed the legislation to target only violent offenders.78 Law enforcement officials gave Reynolds a list of what they
73. See Dan Walters, Politicos Fail to Do It Right, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 13,
1994, at A3 (stating that legislators were in a "panicky rush to do exactly what Reynolds wanted").
74. See Ken Chavez, Victims' Kin Rally at Capitol, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 5,
1994, at Al. Despite knowledge that A.B. 971 contained flaws that could be considered as only embarrassing drafting errors, Reynolds refused to allow any amendments whatsoever. See id. Reynolds stated that "(w]e are not going to allow politicians to take this life-and-death issue and turn it into a political football just because
it is an election year and they want to get re-elected." /d.
After A.B. 971 was amended to conform with the language of the initiative, it
underwent only one further significant amendment. This amendment codified A.B.
971 provisions as subdivisions (b) through (i) of section 667, rather than as a new
section. See People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 505, 917 P.2d 628,
630, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789, 791 (1996).
75. Daniel M. Weintraub, Lone Justice, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1995, at E1 (quoting
L. Paul Sutton, Professor of Criminal Justice Administration, San Diego State University).
76. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
77. The alternative proposals were A.B. 1568 (Rainey), 1993-1994 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 1994) (A.B. 1568); A.B. 167 (Umberg), 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994) (A.B.
167); A.B. 2429 (Johnson), 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994) (A.B. 2429); and
A.B.X1 9 (Johnson), 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994) (A.B.Xl 9). In the wake of
tragedies like that of Polly Klaas and Kimber Reynolds, revision of current sentencing laws was appropriate for debate. Most of the legislators who proposed "threes~rikes". legislation, however, had an added incentive because of the upcoming electl~n .. Bill Jones was poised to become California's next Secretary of State. See Dana
W1lk1e, Is It Fame? With Three Strikes at Issue, Two Key Dads Are on the Outs, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 13, 1994, at A3. Jim Costa was preparing to exit the Assembly for a state senatorship. See id. Tom Umberg was preparing to run for Attorney General against Dan Lungren. See id. Finally, Republican Richard Rainey, a
former sheriff, was running for higher office at the time. See Rick Del Vecchio et al.,
Term-Limit Law Reshuffles State Ballot, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 30, 1995, at Al.
78. See James Richardson, 'Three Strikes' Supporters Divided, SACRAMENTO
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had projected that A.B. 971 would cost California billions of dollars,
the Committee amended the bill to allocate some funds for crime
84
prevention. Reynolds arose from the audience and stated: "When
we start adding amendments ... it's going to open a Pandora's box. .
. . It will also demonstrate to me at least the inability of the Legisla85
ture to act in a responsible way." He reminded the Committee of
86
the upcoming elections. One senator objected to what he termed a
87
"threat," but minutes later the amendment was repealed. Senator
Quentin Kopp remarked on the failure of his colleagues to exercise
their authority despite Reynolds's objections, "They feel threatened
in an election year and they're afraid of being denounced as trying
88
.
to subvert his initiative."
Reynolds distrusted not only legislators but also prosecutors
and criminal justice experts who argued in favor of a more focused
bill. Even though Reynolds's goal was to keep violent criminals
locked up, he would not listen to advisers who told him that revisions would ensure that violent felons would be the target of the
89
bill. Even Bill Jones, one of the bill's sponsors, insinuated that
A.B. 971 had room for improvement.90 Reynolds rejected a list of
suggestions from law enforcement officials who identified flaws in
91
the original bil1. As observed by Marc Klaas, "[w]hat's driving
Mike is his passion. ... Mike doesn't want to be reasoned with." 92
The eventual split between Klaas and Reynolds demonstrated
Reynolds's enormous power. As developed below, various legislators proposed alternatives to "three strikes." 93 After studying the alternatives, Klaas withdrew support for A.B. 971 because it put too
many nonviolent criminals behind bars.94 As Klaas stated, "[i]n the
depth of despair which all Californians shared with my family immediately following Polly's murder, we blindly supported the
[Reynolds] initiative in the mistaken belief that it dealt only with

84. See Morain, supra note 6, at A l.
85. /d.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. Hecht, supra note 66, at A 1.
89. See Richardson, supra note 78, at A4.
90. See Morain, supra note 6, at Al.
91. See Richardson, supra note 78, at A4.
92. Dan Morain, ' Three Strikes': A Steamroller Driven by One Man's Pain , L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 1994, at A3.
93. See infra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
94. See Heft, supra note 7, at 27.
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95

violent crimes. "
Despite the role of Polly's death in generating public support
for "three strikes," Klaas's defection had little impact. By then,
Reynolds had obtained sufficient signatures to place the initiative on
the ballot. 96 He had also enlisted the support of prominent politicians, including Governor Pete Wilson, both major Democratic gu97
bernatorial candidates, and the Attorney General. Reynolds dismissed Klaas's stated concerns with the potentially staggering costs
98
of "three strikes" and questioned his motives.
Reynolds was not the only "three strikes" proponent unwilling
to compromise. Governor Wilson used the occasion of Polly Klaas's
funeral to make a political speech, announcing his support for "three
strikes."99 Even after its flaws became apparent, but during a difficult reelection campaign, Wilson resisted compromise in order to
100
preserve his position as the candidate toughest on crime. His unyielding attitude is reflected in the following anecdote: According to
Klaas, Wilson indicated at Polly's funeral that he would support a
number of the alternative bills. 101 When Klaas switched his position,
he called the Governor to solicit support for Assembly Bill 1568
(A.B. 1568), a narrower proposal supported by Assemblyman Richard Rainey. 102 By then, Wilson was fully committed to Reynolds's
95. Lou Cannon, A Dark Side co 3-Strikes Laws, WASH. POST, June 20, 1994, at
A15.
96. Mike Reynolds had gathered the requisite number of signatures necessary to
qualify the initiative for the November 8, 1994, general election by early April of
that year. See Memorandum from Elections Division, Office of the Secretary of
State, State of California, to All County Clerks/Registrars of Voters (94089) (Apr. 6,
1994) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
97. See Dan Morain, Lawmakers Jump on '3 Strikes' Bandwagon, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 1994, at A3.
98. Reynolds was surprised by Klaas's challenge to his bill, and he responded as
other victims groups did by questioning Marc Klaas's motives. See Bill Ainsworth,
'Three Strikes' Spokesman Has Change of Heart, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 4, 1994, at 7.
Reynolds's public comments about Marc Klaas ranged from benign to venomous.
See id. Reynolds realized that the strength of his support was severely diminished by
the loss of Klaas's support and speculated that Klaas had been "either lied to or
misinformed." /d. In contrast, Klaas was voicing legitimate debatable concerns.
" It's too expensive . ... If you start taking money out of social programs, then you
aren 't going to meet the goal of the Polly Klaas Foundation, which is to make
America safe for children." /d. That Klaas could consider the costs and alternate
proposals was laudable, but he was unable to convince Reynolds to enter into any
sort of meaningful debate regarding his bill or any other.
99. See Hecht, supra note 66, at Al .
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
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bill and told Klaas that he would not support A.B. 1568 because he
"didn't know how the crime victims felt." 103 Klaas responded, "I
don't think you remember who you're talking to." 104

B. Other Political Players
A recent report by the National Criminal Justice Commission
(NCJC) identified several myths about violent crime that have influenced public policy for over a decade. 105 For example, the report
found that politicians and the media have misled the public into believing that crime rates and violent crime are -soaring, despite con106
trary evidence. The report identified the threat posed by groups
that benefit from the perception of a crime wave, such as the socalled "prison-industrial complex," comprising groups which profit
from prison construction and maintenance. 107
A number of those groups were active supporters of Reynolds
and "three strikes." Among Reynolds's financial backers were the
California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA), the
National Rifle Association, the California Gun Owners Association,
the Republican Party, and the campaign committees of Republican
senatorial candidate Michael Huffington and Governor Wilson. 108
All of these entities had a political stake in the passage of "three
103. ld.
104. ld.
105. See NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM'N, THE REAL WAR ON CRIME 63-67
(Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996). The NCJC report identified five myths concerning
crime which are demonstrably false, yet continue to have a profound impact on
criminal justice policy. See id. The five myths are: (1) Street crime is increasingstreet crime in fact dropped slightly in 1993 and 1994; (2) Street crime is more violent
today-the reality is that serious violent crime is 16% below the peak level of the
1970s; (3) More police officers are being killed-bulletproof vests have contributed to
a 50% drop in killings of law enforcement officers between 1973 and 1993; (4) Street
crime costs more than corporate crime-the Justice Department reported that in
1991 , white-collar crime cost 7 to 25 times as much as street crime; and (5) Criminals
are different from the rest of us-many citizens have in fact committed a crime punishable by a sentence in jail, such as drunk driving or filing a false expense report.
See id.
106. See id. at 68-98 (discussing the myriad factors that artificially inflate the public's fear of crime despite empirical data reflecting the opposite).
_ 107. See id. at 85-98. Alarming is that government spending on crime control has
mcreased at more than twice the rate of defense spending. See id. at 85.
108. See Bill Ainsworth, A Marriage of Convenience, RECORDER (San Francisco),
No~. 30, 1994, at 1; Wilkie, supra note 81, at Al. Notably, Michael Huffington's donatton made him a co-chair of the Three Strikes You're Out Committee. See Pamela
1. Podger, 'Three Strikes' Campaign Leaves Ballot Organizers $200,000 in the Hole,
FRESNO BEE, Nov. 29, 1994, at Bl.
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CCPOA has wielded political power by targeting politicians
who challenge its agenda. The organization targeted Assembly
Ways and Means Chairman John Vasconcellos for defeat after he
119
failed to support its position on prison bonds.
Although Vasconcellos prevailed, he learned a hard lesson from the experience: "I
have no desire to get into another fight with Don Novey... . It was
obvious that they spent an inordinate amount of money in an at120
tempt to unseat me .. .. I'm not about to fan the embers."
CCPOA was more successful in its bid to unseat Assemblyman
Bob Epple, who headed the Assembly Public Safety Committee.
CCPOA opposed Epple even though he supported most of its bills;
it opposed him because CCPOA's leaders believed that he was or121
chestrating hearings to defeat its bills.
CCPOA demonstrated similar power politics during the "threestrikes" campaign. For example, when Los Angeles District Attorney Gil Garcetti supported Rainey's A.B. 1568, a CCPOA lobbyist
reminded Garcetti that a CCPOA endorsement was crucial to his
reelection and that the CCPOA would oppose him unless he supported "three strikes." 122 The lobbyist suggested that Garcetti would
suffer when he refused to switch his support. 123
C. The Legislature's Knowledge of A.B. 971's Flaws

California politicians cannot claim surprise about A.B. 971 's
flaws. The Senate Judiciary Committee prepared an analysis dem124
onstrating some of the bill's more serious flaws. Legislators also
had available detailed reports of the comparative merits of various
125
competing "three-strikes" measures.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See Craig Marine, Up from ' The Hole', S.F. EXAMINER, 1une 26, 1994, at B4.
/d.

See Ainsworth, supra note 108, at 1.
See id.
. 12~. See id. It is not surprising that the CCPOA wanted to silence a high profile
dtstnct attorney like Garcetti as the CCPOA stood to gain 49,218 additional jobs
f~om "three strikes" in the next 35 years-compared to only 14,391 in the same penod under the Rainey bill. See id.
124. See SENATE JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971, supra note 18, at 4-12.
125. Fo_r example, the Rainey bill, A.B. 1568, mandated a sentence of life imprisonment wtthout possibility of parole for defendants with a present conviction for a
"~erious" felony and two prior convictions for "violent" felonies or for defendants
W_'th ~ present conviction for a violent felony and two prior convictions for any co m~matton of serious or violent felonies. See A.B. 1568 (Rainey), 1993-1994 Reg. Sess.
§ 2 (Cal. 1994). An indeterminate sentence with a minimum of 25 years was reserved
for _defendants convicted of a third serious felony. See id. Defendants convicted of a
senous or violent felony with one prior violent conviction would have had their sen-
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Assembly approved all five "three-strikes" bills by the end of Janu130
ary, 1994, and sent them to the Senate without a fiscal analysis.
Three days before the Senate voted on A.B. 971, the California
Department of Corrections (CDC) distributed its report to key legislators.131 The CDC projected that the legislation would add $5.7 billion per year in operating costs by fiscal year 2027-2028 and would
require twenty new prisons in addition to the twelve prisons already
planned for fiscal year 2003-2004 and the sixteen new prisons con132
structed during the past ten years. The total cost of construction
133
would be $21.3 billion.
The legislature failed to explain how it would finance the increased costs. Later Governor Wilson stated that "[o]bviously, we
134
build prisons by passing [prison] bonds." That solution may be illusory; for example, in 1990 Californians defeated a proposed bond
135
issue of $450 million for prison bonds. While fear of crime has increased since 1990, so too have the stakes in light of the $21 billion
estimate for the cost of prison construction alone.
D. Better Alternatives to A.B. 971
During passa~e of "three strikes," sounder alternatives were
readily available. 13 As legislators must have known, Reynolds's bill

130. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR (A.B. 971), supra note 128, at 2 (exemplifying the failure to include a fiscal analysis); Morain, supra note 129, at A3.
131. See Memorandum from Richard S. Welch, Chief, Offender Information
Services Branch, Department of Corrections, to James H. Gomez, Director of Corrections 1 (Feb. 28, 1994) [hereinafter Welch Memorandum] (on file with the Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review).
132. See id. at 9.
133. See id.; CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 112.
134. Gordon Smith, Crime Measure Seen as Pricey Proposition, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Oct. 16, 1994, at Al.
135. See John Hurst, Full Cells and Empty Pockets, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1991 , at
Al ; see also Jon Matthews, Wilson Still Pitching for 'Three Strikes' Law, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 3, 1994, at A1 (stating that Wilson believed that Californians
would be willing to bear the costs of " three strikes"). There has been further evidenc~ that the pr?posed bond financing may not work. In the June 1994 primary
electton, voters reJected a bond measure for earthquake recovery, a proposal to buy
park Ian~, a proposal to improve college campuses, and a proposal for public school
constructiOn. See Virginia Ellis, Defeat of Quake Relief Bonds Adds to Budget Crisis,
L_.A. TIMES, June 9, 1994, at Al. Bruce Cain, Professor at the University of Califorma, Berkeley stated that " (t]he election .. . shows that bond measures, which were
the panacea of the '80s for public finance, are not ooino to be a panacea in the
19?0s." Susan Yoachum & John Wildermuth, Califor~ian~ Voted Against Spending,
Crtme, S.F. CHRON., June 9, 1994, at A 1.
136. See infra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
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The Rainey bill promised to provide protection at a more realistic cost than would "three strikes." One obvious savings came
from the requirement that the third felony must be serious or violent
141
to trigger a long prison term, thereby eliminating the widely publicized cases of defendants whose third felony is minor, such as drug
142
possession or petty theft. A.B. 1568 also did not include residenlaw enforceme nt organizations, and it proved to be the most viable alte rnative to
A.B. 971 and the Reynolds initiative. See Kevin Fagan, Call for Changes Fails to
Resonate in the East Bay Legislation Contests, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 23, 1994, at 18.
141. See Cal. A .B. 1568 § 2.
142. See id. Several "three-strikes" cases decided before the California Supreme
Court decision in Romero yielded sentences that appear disproportionate to the triggering felony. Ricky Valadez, for example, was sentenced to 25 years to life for
stealing a drill from a garage. See Rene Lynch & Anna Cekola, '3 Strikes' Law
Causes Juror Unease in O.C. , L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1995, at Al. With two prior burglary convictions, including one dating back to the 1970s, his third minor felony
struck him out. See id. Jerry Dewayne Williams received a similar sentence for
stealing a slice of pizza-this third strike provided him with a 25-year bunk reservation in state prison. See Eric Slater, Pizza Thief Receives Sentence of25 Years to Life
in Prison, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at B9. Duane Silva, who has an IQ of 70 and
was previously convicted of setting trash barrels and a car's glove compartment on
fire, was sentenced to 30 years to life for stealing a neighbor's video recorder and
coin collection. See id. Billy Sharod, who had previous convictions for robbery and
petty theft, received a life sentence for selling $10 worth of rock cocaine to an undercover officer. See Anna Cekola, $10 Cocaine Sale Becomes 'Third Strike, ' L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1995, at Bl.
This trend defined defendants convicted under "three strikes." During the
first eight months of the law, approximately 70% of all second- and third-strike defendants were convicted of nonviolent and nonserious offenses. See DAVID
ESPARZA, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, THE "THREE STRIKES AND YOU' RE
OUT" LAW- A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 8 (1995). The number of second- and
third-strike offenders convicted for nonviolent offenses soared to 85 % after two
years of implementation of the law. See CHRISTOPHER DAVIS ET AL., CENTER ON
JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, "THREE STRIKES": THE NEW APARTHEID 2
(1996). Ironically, in the two years since the "three -strikes" law soared through the
legislature as a response to public fear and anger over violent crime, the law has Jed
to life imprisonment for 192 marijuana users who previously would have served little
or no time, while only 40 convicted murderers, 25 rapists, and 24 kidnappers have
received life sentences. See Giles Whittell, Small- Time Drug Crooks Clog California
P:isons, TIMES (London), Mar. 9, 1996, at 12 (citing figures released by the California Department of Corrections). As of January 1996, out of the 14,497 convicted
second-strike offenders, approximately 80% were committed to prison for a nonviolent offense; furthermore, of the 1342 convicted third-strike offenders, approximately 62% were committed to prison for a nonviolent offense. See LEGISLATIVE
ANALYST'S OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF THE "THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT" LAW
ON CALIFORNIA'S JUSTICE SYSTEM 5 (1996).
The prosecutorial power under "three strikes" to impose such disproportionate sentencing without regard to judicial opinion came to an end with the California
Supreme Court decision in People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 917
P.2d 628, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789 (1996). At the age of 32, the time of his last offense,
Romero was convicted of his third felony. See People v. Superior Court (Romero ),
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149

gina!, repeat offender because, as documented in a number of important studies, a sma~l percentage of the ~~minal pop~lation
commits an extremely high number of offenses. Hence, usmg the
average number of offenses per year-180--rather than the median
number of offenses per year-15-inflated the projected savings. 151
Typical of the legislature's unwillingness to deal with the economic realities of A.B. 971 was the Senate Appropriations Committee's handling of the various bills. A month after the Ways and
Means Committee analysis was available, the Senate Committee
convened to discuss the fiscal impact of the various "three-strikes"
measures. 152 The Committee had available the fiscal analysis of A.B.
971 but did not have similar projections for Rainey's or Umberg's
bills. 153 Nevertheless, members of the Committee recognized that
residential burglary was not a strike under those measures· and must
149. In response to proponents' use of the RAND study to estimate that the number of offenses the average repeat offender commits per year, RAND stated that
"[t]his figure was skewed by the fact that 10 percent of the group was extremely active, committing more than 600 crimes apiece. The typical inmate-the median in
the distribution-reports having committed 15 crimes per year." /d. It is reasonable
to assume that high rate offenders are more likely to be arrested. Hence, dramatic
increases in incarceration rates are likely to lead to incarceration of lower-rate offenders. Therefore, the effect of the crime rate will not be constant. As low-rate offenders are incarcerated, there will be less effect on overall crime rates.
150. See, for example, MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL. , DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH
COHORT (1972), a widely cited study on offender crime rates, which reviewed records of 9945 boys from their tenth through eighteenth birthdays. While approximately one-third had a record of involvement with police, 627 boys had five or more
arrests during those years. See id. at 88. That small group committed over one-half
of the recorded delinquencies and two-thirds of the violent offenses. See id.; see also
MARK H. MOORE ET AL., DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: THE ELUSIVE TARGET OF
JUSTICE 38-39 (1984) (implying that a portion of high-rate offenders are so activecommitting more than 50 robberies per year-that incapacitation would be wholly
justified based on deterrence, rehabilitative, or retributivist theories of punishment).
See generally JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN
NATURE 24-26 (1985) (discussing patterns in criminality).
151. See A SSEMBLY PUBLIC SAFETY, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971 , supra note 146, at 2.
152. See CALIFORNIA SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMM. ANALYSIS OF A.B.X1 9,
1993-1994 Reg. Sess. 1 (Feb. 28, 1994) (hereinafter SENATE APPROPRIATIONS,
ANALYSIS OF A .B.X1 9); CALIFORNIA SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMM. ANALYSIS OF
A.B. 167, 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. 1 (Feb. 28, 1994), available in LEXIS, Cal Library,
Cacomm File [hereinafter SENATE APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 167);
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS, A NALYSIS OF A.B. 971 , supra note 137, at 1; CALIFORNIA
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMM. ANALYSIS OF A.B. 1568, 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. 1
(Feb. 28, 1994) (hereinafter SENATE APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 1568];
CALIFORNIA SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMM. ANALYSIS OF A.B. 2429, 1993-1994
Reg. Sess. 1 (Feb. 28, 1994) (hereinafter SENATE APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF
A.B. 2429].
153. See Welch Memorandum, supra note 131, at 1-9.
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stead of A.B. 971 by arguing that the former was tougher on crime
and more fiscallJ responsible, two issues that predominated the
12
politics of 1994. • That .did not ha~~en for. a number of reaso~s,
dealing largely With election year politics. Wilson was outspoken m
his support of Reynolds. Even before his chief economist produced
a methodologically flawed report, grossly inflating the savings from
163
the initiative, Wilson argued that the economic concerns of oppo164
Had Wilson distanced
nents of "three strikes" were overstated.
himself from Reynolds or had Reynolds been willing to work with
165
Rainey, better legislation might have resulted.
Frustrated with Wilson and Reynolds, Assembly Speaker Willie
Brown threatened that the legislature would approve all five bills
and "[p]ut everything on the governor's desk and let him deal with
GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 137, at X!II-XtV. See generally SENATE APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971, supra note 137 (implicitly admitting that lower
costs would result if residential burglary was not a qualifying prior).
162. Crime was a hot issue for the 1994 California gubernatorial race with 27% of
Californians saying it was the election's most important issue. See Bill Stall, Brown
Ads Target lob Losses, Crime, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 1994, at A3 (hereinafter Stall, Ads
Target Losses]. Governor Wilson and the Republican Party quickly seized on the
crime issue making it the dominant theme of a three-day GOP convention in San
Francisco. See Bill Stall, GOP Pins '94 Hopes on Crime Issue, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28,
1994, at A3 (hereinafter Stall, GOP Pins Hopes]. The Republican Party adopted a
"tough-on-crime" plank that was intended to propel Republicans to victories in the
state legislative elections as well as the gubernatorial race. See id.
Fiscal responsibility was another theme of the gubernatorial race. Governor
Wilson, regretting giving consent for a seven billion dollar tax increase in his first
year as governor, sought to portray himself in the campaign as a defender against tax
increases. See id. Both candidates, Wilson and Kathleen Brown, proposed various
solutions to the state's debt, such as Brown's suggestion of a one-time issuance of
bonds, and Wilson's suggestion of a demand of reimbursement from the federal government for the expenses California incurred in incarcerating illegal aliens. See Special Guide to California's Elections: Governor's Race-The Issues , L.A. TIMES, Oct.
30, 1994, at W2. Both candidates treaded cautiously on the economic issue, which
36% of Californian voters considered to be the most important of the election. See
Stall, Ads Target Losses, supra, at A3.
163. See infra notes 180-94 and accompanying text.
164. Governor Wilson balked at any suggestion that the "three-strikes" bills
would not be economically feasible. See Matthews, supra note 135, at Al. Wilson
s~id, "There's really no dispute that these reforms will require considerable addittonal expense .... That is an expense, I submit, that the public is willing to pay ....
y.te cannot afford not to pay." Id. Wilson also stated, "We're producing . . . capital
tmp~o.~emen~s for future generations, and they rightly can be called upon to help pay
for tt. Dante! M. Weintraub, '3 Strikes' Law Goes Into Effect, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8,
1994, at Al.
165. ~row':~ stated, "If the three-strikes sponsors would come to the reality of the
defects m thetr measure, they probably would embrace the Rainey measure and that
would reach the governor's desk." Richardson, supra note 78, at A4.
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it. . .
And that's a pure, unadulterated, practical political ap167
166
proach." The Assembly did just that.
A similar strategy almost developed in the Senate that would
have forced Wilson to make the choice among competing alternatives. Wilson wanted the legislature to combine competing measures, casting the "widest net," and he threatened to sign all of the
bills passed by the Senate, allowing the courts to determine which
law was in effect. 168 The drafters of the four alternatives to A.B. 971
added a provision automatically repealing the measure if any other
measure was subsequently enacted. 169 The provision would have
forced Wilson to decide which bill to sign last.
The Senate ultimately refrained from passing all of the bills simultaneously. Instead, the Senate delayed action on the four competitors to A.B. 971, averting Wilson's need to make a choice. 170 Despite the overwhelmin~ support for A.B. 971, when the legislature
1 1
ultimately voted on it, A.B. 971 passed in an atmosphere of political distrust. Reynolds would neither compromise nor work with
Rainey on an alternative bill. m In reaction to what he saw as the
unsavory nature of the political process and fearful that the legislature might later weaken A.B. 971, Reynolds pursued the initiative
process despite an earlier promise to the contrary. 173
166. /d.
167. See Morain, supra note 129, at A3.
168. See Daniel M. Weintraub, Wilson Calls for Unified Crime Bill, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 1994, at A3.
169. Section 9 of Rainey's bill, A.B. 1568, provides an example of the voiding
provision:
The provisions of this act shall become operative on April1 , 1994, unless either Assembly Bill 167, Assembly Bill 971 , or Assembly Bill 2429 of the
1993-94 Regular Session, or Assembly Bill 9 of the 1993-94 First Extraordinary Session, or any combination thereof, are enacted after this act, in
which case this act shall not become operative.
A .B. 1568 (Rainey), 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. § 9 (Cal. 1994). For analogous provisions,
see A.B. 167 (Umberg), 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. § 14 (Cal. 1994); A.B. 2429 (Johnson),
1993-1994 Reg. Sess. § 4 (Cal. 1994). The measures also contained provisions which
would void them if the voter initiative, Proposition 184, was passed by the voters in
November of that year. See, e.g. , Cal. A.B. 1568 § 10.
170. See Morain, supra note 80, at A 1. The other measures were sent to committee for possible incorporation into a future crime package. See id.
171. A.B. 971 passed through four committees and two floor votes in 59 days. See
Jones, supra note 127, at 244. The bill passed the Assembly by a vote of 63-9 and
passed the Senate by a vote of 29-7. See 1 ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY, 712 (Cai.Reg.
1993-1994 Reg. Sess.).
172. See Hecht, supra note 66, at A1 (reporting Reynolds's refusal to allow
amendments).
173. See Wilkie, supra note 81, at A1.
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The Governor, who had highly politicized the crime issue,
cried foul often when the legislature questioned the fiscal soundness
of the bill and when it did not combine the bills into a single, even
tougher bill. 175 Senator Lockyer wanted to revisit the alternatives
176
Reynolds asked Assembly
once A.B. 971 had been passed.
Speaker Brown to use his leadership to improve on the law with
elements of Rainey's bill. But Brown smelled a political rat and was
convinced this was a ploy to attack Democrats for trying to weaken
the law during the election campaign. m Few in the legislature were
willing to take on Reynolds or Wilson, who would have portrayed
opponents as soft on crime, a tough label to wear in 1994. The irony
was that legislators like Rainey were in some ways touRher on crime
8
than Reynolds, and certainly more fiscally responsible.
F. A "Spectacular" Savings for California

Even after the legislature passed A.B. 971, Democrats were unsuccessful in minimizing crime as an election issue. Republicans
179
stood to gain by placing "three strikes" in the election spotlight.

174. Governor Wilson strengthened his position as the '"tough-on-crime" candidate by holding a two-day crime summit in Hollywood, California, which was attended by over 1000 state politicians, crime victims, and law enforcement officials.
See Dan Morain & Daniel M. Weintraub, Wilson Crime Summit to Have Hard-Line
Focus, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 1994, at A28.
175. See Weintraub, supra note 168, at A3. Wilson attacked the senate for failing
to combine the "toughest provisions" of each of the competing bills. See id. He said:
" We have the opportunity to give the public all the protection it needs. . . . We
shouldn't play political games." /d.
176. Bill Lockyer stated, " Maybe when [the Jones/Costa bill] is behind us, we can
move on to a more comprehensive discussion of crime in a less impassioned or less
political atmosphere." Morain, supra note 80, at AI (also reporting that Lockyer
voted for A.B. 971 even though he opposed much of its content).
177. See James Richardson, Brown Won 't Touch "3 Strikes" This Year,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 16, 1994, at A4. When asked if he would respond to Reynolds's request to craft a better bill, the Speaker stated:
Mr. Reynolds is not going to run me out there on that tree and saw it. . . . I
know exactly what Mr. Reynolds and people like that would like to do.
They have a measure on the ballot in the fall, and they absolutely need to
have that to try to defeat (United States Senator] Dianne Feinstein and to
get Wilson a leg up.
/d.

178. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
179. See Morain, supra note 92, at A3. The report stated that Michael Huffington
was the largest contributor to the YES on 184 Committee with a donation of
$350,000. See id. According to a consultant to the committee, Huffington '" wanted
very much to use it as a campaign issue."' Id. (quoting Charles Cavalier, political
consultant for Mike Reynolds and Proposition 184).
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Wilson, involved in a tough race, used crime as a campaign issue.
After Wilson signed A.B. 971 into law, his chief economist, Philip
Romero, issued a report ar~uing that "three strikes" would save
California billions of dollars. 1 1 The report contended that the public
debate over the cost of "three strikes" was one-sided. Romero
claimed to balance the debate by fully discussing the benefits that
182
"three strikes" would generate.
Romero calculated the benefits of the law by quantifying (1)
crime victims' direct out-of-pocket costs; (2) lost earnings and pain
and suffering; and (3) savings in costs associated with prevention of
crime, no longer necessary because "three strikes" would prevent
183
the crimes in the first instance. Romero was correct-both when
he recognized that the latter two categories are "softer" figures and
that, nevertheless, both have real value.184
Without acknowledging important methodological questions
185
about a RAND Corporation study from the early 1980s, Romero
relied on self-reports by prison inmates concerning the number of
crimes committed when the incarcerated offender was on the
186
street. Despite a median of only fifteen reported crimes per offender, Romero based his calculations on a "highly conservative"
estimate that each offender incarcerated as a result of "three
strikes" would otherwise commit between 20 and 150 crimes per
187
year. The RAND report, consistent with other studies, indicated
that some offenders commit in excess of 600 offenses per year,
making the average far greater than the median of fifteen crimes per
ISiS
year.
180. See Weintraub, supra note 168, at A3.
181. See PHILIP J. ROMERO, GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH,
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, HOW INCARCERATING MORE FELONS WILL BENEFIT
CALIFORNIA'S ECONOMY 2-5 {1994).
182. See id. at 2-4.
183. See id. at 2.
184. See id. at 3. There is a certain irony to Governor Wilson's reliance on pain
and suffering as a measure of the cost of crime. In 1992 the Governor, along with a
coalition of business and medical groups, attempted to e xtend the limits on pain and
suffering under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 to all civil liability cases. See Philip Hager, Civil Liability System Faces Uncivil War, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 1992, at A3.
185. For a discussion of methodological problems with a survey like the RAND
Study, see FRANKLIN E . ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 80-86 {1995) .
186. See ROMERO, supra note 181 , at 2.
187. See id.
188. RAND data reports that the average repeat offender commits between 187
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Romero also relied on estimated savings in unnecessary security
services rendered obsolete if crimes were not committed. Admitting
that the figures were arbitrary, Romero used a range of between
twenty-five to se~en~~-five pe~cent in reduction of actual spending
on crime prevention. He estimated upper and lower ranges based
on estimates that between 20 and 150 crimes would be prevented
and that society would reduce the amount spent on security meas190
ures between twenty-five and seventy-five percent. The savings,
191
he said, would range from $137,000 to $515,000.
The report concluded that a reasonable estimate of savings to
society would be between $200,000 and $300,000 for each year an offender was incarcerated, adding up to a total benefit of $29 billion
192
by the year 2000. The savings in 2028 alone were projected to be
$54 billion.193 These figures, Romero asserted, were based on conservative estimates and represented minimum social benefits to be
realized as a result of "three strikes." His estimates were far in exand 278 crimes per year. See ASSEMBLY PUBLIC SAFETY, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 971, su·
pra note 146, at 2. Extremely active offenders, however, composing approximately
10% of the group, commit more than 600 crimes apiece. See id.
189. See ROMERO, supra note 181, at 2.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 3. To calculate the savings for crimes avoided, Romero looked at
the fraction of a single crime's share of crime prevention costs that would be actually
avoided. See id. at 3, 6. The study admittedly chose an "arbitrar[y]" range of between 25% and 75% in actual spending reduction. See id. From this, Romero surmised that if the upper range of 150 crimes were avoided, the social costs reduced
would be between $302,000 and $515,000. See id. If only 20 crimes were avoided,
the social costs reduced would be between $137,000 and $248,000. See id. at 3.
Romero legitimized his calculations by citing a 1990 study from the BOTEC Analysis
Corporation which reported a range of social costs reduced between $390,000 and
$2.8 million. See id. (citing BOTEC ANALYSIS CORP., A COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF
PRISON CELL CONSTRUCTION AND ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS (1990)).
192. See id. at 5. In order to project the " savings," Romero merely took the California Department of Corrections (CDC) figures for increased inmate years with
" three strikes" and multiplied it by $200,000. See id. at 4. Romero agreed with the
CDC that there would be in excess of 272,000 "three-strikes" inmates incarcerated in
2028 . . See id. at 5. Therefore, Romero projected a $54-billion savings. See id. The
costs m that year, amortizing the costs of capital construction, were just $6 billion.
See id. Therefore, California would receive a windfall of $48 billion in 2028, and for
~very year thereafter. See id. The $29 billion figure was calculated adding the savmgs for the first five years of additional incarceration. See id. Romero projected
t~at the total costs for the first five years of "three strikes" would add up to $6 bilhon, thereby yielding a savings of $23 billion. See id. The Three Strikes Committee
used this figure in the voter pamphlet in part to show that trying this system out
could not hurt the state financially as opponents claimed. See California Ballot
Pamphlet, supra note 2, at 37.
193. See ROMERO, supra note 181 , at 5.
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G. The Initiative and a Failed Alternative
After passage of A.B. 971, the Senate briefly considered reviv198
ing the Rainey measure and placing it on the ballot. Wilson opposed the alternative measure because it would mislead the voters
and because he had touted the virtues of the original bill as a pri199
mary campaign issue. He threatened to veto the alternative proposaJ.200 In light of the threatened veto, Rainey refused to champion
the bill despite broad support from various law enforcement groups
like the CDAA,201 officials including state sheriffs and police chiefs,
198. See Hallye Jordan, Alternative '3 Strikes' Bill Pushed, L.A. DAILY J., June 10,
1994, at 3.
199. See George Skelton, Pete (Give 'em Hell) Wilson Strikes Back, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 1994, at A3. In support of applying "three strikes" in a famous case where a
defendant mugged a homeless person for 50 cents, Wilson said:
The editorial writers, the pundits are claiming this thug is a victim of a misguided law .... The ·victim' has~ rap she~t that is 5~ pages long.... _The
critics say that's proof of everythmg that IS wrong with the 'three stnkes'
law. Well, the hell with that. I say it's proof of everything that's right with
'three strikes.'
/d.
200. See Wilson Says He Will Block Try to Weaken '3 Strikes', S.F. CHRON., June
10, 1994, at D3.
201. The support from the CDAA waned when Rainey refused to back the bill.
See Michael D. Harris, Garcetti Calls for New 3-Strikes Law, L.A. DAILY J., June 9,
1994, at 2. Gil Garcetti went public with his plea for the Rainey alternative. See id.
Garcetti was joined in his public campaign by San Mateo County District Attorney
James Fox in urging the legislature to pass the alternative bill. See id. Specifically,
Garcetti predicted, "there's not going to be justice for those citizens who rely on the
civil court process for relief and justice." /d. Garcetti reported that in just three
months, his office had filed 400 third-strike cases and 1100 second-strike cases. See
id. He further reported that "none of those cases are settling and that they all are
going to go to trial." /d. In the weeks after " three strikes" was passed, the Los Angeles District Attorney announced that he was eliminating sections of his office to
·'free up" experienced deputies for " three-strikes" cases. See id.
In support of the alternative, Garcetti pleaded, " (!Jet the taxpayers of California decide how their tax dollars are spent in prosecuting violent criminals." Carl
Ingram, Support Sought for '3 Strikes' Alternative, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 1994, at A3.
Co-author of A.B. 971, Jim Costa, who was running for a state senate seat, responded: "Voters have a choice in November. They can vote for ['three strikes') or
they can vote against it." /d.
.
In addition, Garcetti and district attorneys supporting him were made to look
hke the enemy. Chuck Cavalier, a consultant with the Three Strikes You' re Out
Committ~e, accused Garcetti and like-minded district attorneys of only being concerned With plea bargaining and clearina caseloads. See Peter Hecht Case Merits '3
Strikes'? Depends on the DA, SACRA~ENTO BEE, Aug. 7, 1994, at Al. He said
"'(t]hat ~hey ~imply don't like the fact that they will be held accountable." /d. This
acc~sataon d1d no~ comport with the fact that, despite his personal opposition, Gar~detti was prosecutmg every possible third-strike case coming through his office. See
l .
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H. Proposition 184: Misleading the Voters
The Romero study contains serious methodological flaws that
grossly overstate the benefits of Proposition 184. Nonetheless, proponents of Proposition 184 relied heavily on the report in campaign208
ing for the ballot initiative. This Section reviews some of the ways
in which voters were misled.
Claims that "three strikes" will reduce crime are premised on
two straightforward propositions. First, repeat offenders will not be
209
able to commit additional crimes when they are in prison. That is,
"[u]nlike probation and parole, incarceration makes it physically
impossible for offenders to victimize the public with new crimes for
210
as long as they are locked up. " Second, Ion~ prison sentences will
11
deter other criminals from committing crimes.
208. See supra notes 179-96, 203-07 and accompanying text.
209. For example, the president of the California Police Chiefs' Association
wrote, " (b]y depriving these recent offenders of a future life of crime, we have
helped create a brighter future for law-abiding residents." Ronald E. Lowenberg, '3
Strikes' Costs Money but Pays Off, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1996, at B9.
At a 1995 University of West Los Angeles symposium on the " three-strikes"
law, Governor Pete Wilson stated that the law "is not only emotionally attractive,
but it is also a judicially sound policy for the simple reason that the repeat, violent
offenders, targeted by the legislation, have shown that they are beyond reform and
that they will only continue to bring terror to our citizens." Pete Wilson, Justice Demands and California Needs-"Three Strikes," 26 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 239, 240
(1995). At the same symposium, California Secretary of State Bill Jones stated that
'"Three Strikes' is an anti-crime law, not just an anti-violent crime law. It was our
intent in enacting 'Three Strikes,' not only to keep dangerous repeat felons in prison
(that is why the third strike can be any felony), but also to begin moving toward the
concept of zero tolerance for crime." Jones, supra note 127, at 245.
An article addressing concerns regarding the type of offenders being caught
in the wide net of California's "three-strikes" law reported that " [i]f the past
[criminal record] is a prologue, then the statute is removing hundreds of offenders
who most predictably would commit more felonies if they weren ' t in prison." Andy
Furillo, Most Offenders Have Long Criminal Histories, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 31,
19%~ at Al. This reasoning, however, is not without criticism. A county assistant
pubhc defender stated: '"I don 't see much difference between that and just running
a record ~heck on the people that have two strikes and going off and arresting them
a~d sen.dmg them to prison. Why go through the process of waiting until they commtt a mmor offense?'" /d.
210. OFFICE OF POLICY DEY., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CASE FOR MORE
INCARCERATION 1 (1992).
211. California State Senator Phil Wyman wrote: "Three Strikes is not aimed
solely at those who have already committed violent or heinous crimes ... . The primary purpose of (the law] is not simply to punish serious or violent felons, but also to
deter other such felons from committino future crimes." Wyman & Schmidt, supra
note 53, at 257.
o
Proponents have stated that "three strikes" has lowered crime rates. See Edgar Sanchez, Crime Declines in State's Big Cities, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 13, 1996,
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society's expenditures for crime prevention would not be reduced in
equal proportion to a reduction in crime, Romero hypothesized the
actual cost reduction if crimes were prevented by the increased in232
capacitation of habitual offenders. He calculated the savings that
would result if society actually did not spend either twenty-five or
seventy-five percent of the costs attributable to each crime
avoided.233 Based on an estimated twenty crimes per year prevented
by a year of incarceration, Romero estimated that a year of imprisonment saves between $137,512 and $248,868, far exceeding the cost
234
of incarceration.
Further, Romero estimated that if "three
strikes" prevented 150 crimes ~er year, the savings would jump to
5
between $302,536 and $515,215.
Small overestimates in either number of crimes or cost per
crime produce dramatic results. Hence, as RAND study author Peter Greenwood has argued, if we rely on average out-of-pocket expenses of between $1000 and $2000 per crime and Romero's twenty
crimes per offender figure, the savings amount to only $20,000 to
236
$40,000 per year. Comparing this figure to the cost of incarcerating an offender leads to different conclusions. Zimring and Hawkins's estimated reduction of only 3.5 crimes per year237 would further
reduce the savings to about $3500 to $7000.
The Romero study contained other flaws that make its conclusions suspect. For example, Romero did not consider the effect of
age on the number of crimes committed per offender per year. 238
Violent felonies are committed most frequently by young male of232. See id. at 3.
233. See id. at 3 tbl.l.
234. See id.
235. See id. Romero's estimated savings from crime prevention measures are almost certainly overstated. Those expenditures are driven by public fear about crime,
rather than by the reality of those risks. See NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM'N,
supra note 105, at 3 (reporting a vast difference between the public perception of
cnme and the reality of crime rates in the United States-the reality being that crime
rates have remained stable for several years). See generally id. at 61-98 (exploring
the prevailing criminal policies and attributing their failure to having been implemented as reactio ns to public fear of crime, rather than crime itself). But " three
strikes" is a case study of how politicians use fear of crime and ignore the realityhere that crime rates were decreasing-for political advantage. See John Vasconcellos,_!~ree Strikes and You 're Out: No, DOCKET, Mar. 1994, at 11 (criticizing such
~ohtlcta~s and stating, "I abhor politicians who pander to people's fear with simplistic and meffective solutions, providing a false sense of security rather than actual
safety.").
236. See Morain, supra note 195, at A3.
237. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
238. See Morain, supra note 195, at A3.
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older felons committing drug offenses would be swept within its sentencing provisions. As supported by follow-up data, many "threestrikes" offenders are older felons who have almost certainly
.
246
. l
"graduated" f rom VIO
ent cnme.
I. The RAND Report

In September, 1994, the RAND Corporation issued a report
concerning the fiscal impact and crime prevention efficiency of
247
"three strikes. " The report might have brought rationality to the
248
"three-strikes" debate.
But given its timing-after alternatives
249
like the Rainey bill had been tabled and the initiative process was
in full swing, and given that Pete Wilson had tied his election cam250
paign to "three strikes" -the RAND report was too little, too
See CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 667(c)(3), 1170.12(a)(3) (mandating that the length of time
between a prior felony conviction and a current felony conviction shall not affect imposition of sentence). For instance, if a 45-year-old defendant had two prior felony
convictions dating back 25 years, and was subsequently convicted of a felony-which
could be a nonserious or nonviolent felony-that defendant would be subject to the
provisions of "three strikes."
246. Second- and third-strike offenders over the age of 30 comprise about 46% of
"three-strikes" defendants. See CAL. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 244, at
chart 8. This statistic is consistent with the rates of violent crime according to age
groups observed by the U.S. Department of Justice in its 1994 crime index. See
CRIME IN THE U.S. 1994, supra, note 240, at 227-28 tbl.38. The statistics from the national crime index reveal that people over the age of 30 accounted for 37.4% of all
violent crimes in 1994, while people over the age of 40 accounted for only 12.8% of
all violent crimes. See id.
Experts also attribute a further 9% drop in the 1995 violent crime rate to the
age factor. See Crimes of Violence Continue to Drop, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 18,
1996, at A 7. Jack Levin of Boston's Northeastern University believes "[t]he baby
boomers have matured into their 30s and 40s .... They are mellowing out, perhaps
aging gracefully, and they are graduating out of high-risk violence and property
crimes ...." 1d.
247. See GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 137, at xi.
248. See id. at 2-3. The stated goals of the RAND Corporation in compiling its
study were: (1) to inform the public about Proposition 184 on the November 1994
ballot; (2) to discuss alternative versions of "three strikes" that may have been con~idered if the Proposition failed; and (3) to inform other states that were considering
Implementation of "three-strikes" laws. See id. The authors remarked that
"[c]itizens are not getting much information on [the cost of "three strikes") from the
law itself, the media, or their elected representatives." !d. at 2. The study concluded
that California would benefit from crime rate reduction if the "three-strikes" law
were fully implemented, but it would come at substantial costs. See id. at xii. RAND
demonstrated that considerable reduction in crime could be achieved at a substantially lower cost than with "three strikes." See id. at xiii.
249. See id. at xii.
250. See Jean 0. Pasco, Wilson Will Test His Themes Nationwide, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Mar. 24, 1995, at 1.
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Ill. THE COURT TO THE RESCUE
"Three strikes" mandates long prison terms for some deserving,
but many undeserving, recidivists. Because the third strike may be
any felony, and most felonies are nonviolent, the law requires long
prison te~s ~n a large .number of cases w~ere the ~.:;derlying conduct is mmor m companson to the sentence Imposed.
In many sentencing schemes judges have discretion to avoid
unjust sentences. Even under sentencing laws like the Federal Sen274
tencing Guidelines, judges have limited discretion to depart from
275
sentencing norms in the interests of justice. Such discretion is important because, no matter how carefully a statute is crafted, legislators cannot anticipate all of the circumstances that may make a particular punishment unjust. Judicial discretion is also a necessary
76
antidote to excessive prosecutorial zeae
273. See supra note 148.
274. The federal system-although it has narrowed judicial discretion-permits
the court to depart from the sentencing guidelines if there is an aggravating or mitigating factor not adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission in determining the guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
275. For example, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines recognize "the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar conduct." /d.§ 3553(a)(6); see also Michael Tonry, Sentencing Guidelines and Their Effects, in THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS
GuiDELINES 16-43 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 1987) (reviewing the sentencing
commissions of Minnesota, Maine, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, and Washington and concluding that the most successful sentencing commissions are those that develop presumptive sentencing guidelines and policies for
appellate sentence review); Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1988)
(providing an overview of the development of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
their intended goals).
276. Perhaps the most noted case in this regard is that of Jerry Dewayne Williams-"the pizza thief." See Slater, supra note 142, at 89. Williams, at the age of
27, was sentenced to prison for 25 years to life for stealing a slice of pepperoni pizza.
See id. Although he was found guilty of petty theft, a standard misdemeanor, his
prior convictions for robbery, attempted robbery, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and possession of a controlled substance, bumped the misdemeanor conviction
up to a felony, which served as his final strike under California's " three-strikes" law.
See id.
There is also the case of Duane Silva, a 23-year-old who suffers from manic
depression and has an IQ of 70. See id. With previous convictions for setting fire to
trash barrels and the glove compartment of a car, Silva's final strike, stealing a video
recorder and a coin collection from his neighbors, landed him a 30 years to life sentence. See id.
Stealing a drill from a garage was Ricky Valadez's final strike. See Lynch &
Ce.kola ..supra note 142, at Al. With two prior residential burglaries serving as prior
stnkes, mcluding one that dated back to the late 1970s, Valadez was sentenced to 25
years to life. See id.
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tion for attempted burglary of an inhabited dwelling, a 1986 conviction for first degree burglary of an inhabited dwelling, and convic282
tions for possession of a controlled substance in 1992 and 1993.
Without "three-strikes" provisions, the defendant's sentence for the
283
offense at bar would have been between one and six years.
The trial court was willing to strike prior felony convictions if
284
Romero pled guilty.
The prosecutor contended that the court
lacked the power to strike prior felony convictions absent prosecutorial consent.285 The court held that, were the statute so read, it
would violate the state constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.286 The court sentenced Romero to a term of six years in
prison. 287 The court of appeal reversed the trial court and held that
"three strikes" denied the trial court authority to dismiss a prior felony conviction on its own motion. 288 The California Supreme Court
granted Romero's petition for review. 289
Romero was the ideal case in which to raise key constitutional
challenges to "three strikes." Three aspects of Romero's record are
compelling: first, none of his convictions involved a crime of violence; second, his serious felonies were committed in the 1980s-the
most recent being approximately eight years before the current felony; third, his current offense, like his other more recent felony
290
convictions, was a drug offense. Incarcerating a man who appears
to be near the end of his criminal career to a term of twenty-five

282. See id.
283. See id. The current charge for possession of a controlled substance was punishable by 16 months, two years, or three years in prison. See id. The three prior
felonies for which defendant served prison terms within the last five years, if not
stricken pursuant to section 1385, would result in three consecutive one-year enhancements. See id. at 506-07, 917 P.2d at 631, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792. The court
imposed a sentence of six years in state prison, representing the upper term for possession of a controlled substance plus the three consecutive one-year enhancements.
See id. at 507, 917 P.2d at 632, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793. Under " three strikes" the defendant was eligible for a life sentence because of his two prior "serious felonies."
See id. at 506, 917 P.2d at 631,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793.
284. See id. at 507, 917 P.2d at 632, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793.
285. See id.
286. See id..
287. See id.
288. See id. The court of appeal also held that Romero's sentence was not a violation of California's prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment. See People v.
Superior Court (Romero), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 382 (Ct. App. 1995), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 13 Cal. 4th 497, 917 P.2d 628, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789 (1996).
289. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 507, 917 P.2d at 632, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793.
290. See id. at 506, 917 P.2d at 631, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792.
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A more plausible interpretation of subsection 667(f)(2) is that a
prosecutor must allege all prior felonies and may thereafter move to
strike in the furtherance of justice or if there is insufficient evidence.
The court would have the obvious, implicit power to grant the motion if appropriate. Such a reading would be consistent with tradi- 301
tional ru1es of statutory constructiOn.
The second sentence would apply even if the prosecutor did not
move to strike and would allow the court to act on its own motion,
or presumably on the motion of the defendant As advanced by its
proponents, however, the statute gives the court no power to strike
prior felonies. The court must, therefore, sentence the defendant in
accordance with the "three strikes" sentencing provisions, unless the
prosecutor moves to strike a prior felony in the interest 9f justice.
That interpretation is consistent with numerous statements by its
proponents and with Reynolds's distrust of liberal sentencing
. dges.302
JU
The supreme court disagreed. After a review of its separationof-powers case law, the court concluded that, if the statute were read
to deny the court authority to strike prior felonies, the statute would
303
violate the state constitution. The court observed that, when selecting between two plausible readings of a statute, the court should
presume that the legislature intended not to violate the constitution.304
The court also relied on the presumption that the legislature
must make a clear statement of its intent to eliminate a court's
power to strike a prior felony or to dismiss in the interests of justice
under section 1385.305 The court found that "three strikes" contained no such clear legislative direction. 306 Not only did the legislation contain no clear direction that the court's power was withdrawn, but, according to the court, subsection 667(f)(2) makes
on insufficient evidence. Therefore, the language empowering the court, on its own
motion, to dismiss factually insupportable allegations is unnecessary. See Romero, 13
Cal. 4th at 523, 917 P.2d at 643, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 804 (citing Jackson v. Virginia,
443 u.s. 307, 313-16 (1979)).
301. When interpreting statutes, courts frequently depart from the literal meaning
of a word to give words a reasonable meaning. See 1 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L.
EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 24 (2d ed. 1988).
302. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
303. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 507-18, 917 P.2d at 632-39, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793800.
304. See id. at 509, 917 P.2d at 633, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 794.
305. See id. at 517-18, 917 P .2d at 639, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800.
306. See id. at 518-28, 917 P.2d at 639-46, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 801-07.
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313

therance of justice.
Implicitly the trial court may grant that motion. The prosecutor may also move to strike a felony conviction
that must be pled if the evidence is insufficient.314 Subsection
667(f)(2) does not limit the court's power to strike felonies; rather, it
makes explicit that a prosecutor's decision is subject to judicial
· ht. :tiS
overs1g
According to the supreme court's reading, subsection 667(f)(2)
deals with prosecutorial responsibility-first, to allege all prior
felonies and second, to strike some. A court's power to grant the
motion to dismiss in the interests of justice is implicit; its power to
grant the motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence is explicit. Its
power to dismiss a prior felony conviction on its own is found in
section 1385 because nothing in section 667 clearly eliminates that
authority.316 The specified authority to dismiss if the evidence of a
prior felony is insufficient only refers to the court's disposition of the
prosecutor's motion; implicit is its power to dismiss on its own
authority.
That explanation is strained. On its face the section only addresses a court's power to grant motions when those motions are
made by the prosecutor. The court's authority to move on its own is
found in section 1385 if in the interest of justice. If the evidence is
insufficient, the court's authority is found in the constitution. The
court's rationale does not explain why, when the prosecutor moves
to dismiss, the section does not mention a court's authority to grant
the prosecutor's motion to dismiss in the interests of justice but does
mention the less controversial power--or obligation317-to dismiss if
the evidence is insufficient.
The strained interpretation of section 667 is unfortunate.
Though the statute is poorly drafted,318 the court's interpretation
leaves the court open to criticism that it frustrated the intent of the

313. See id. at 522-23, 917 P.2d at 642-43, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803-04.
314. See id. at 522, 91 7 P.2d at 642, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803.
315. See id. at 522-23, 917 P.2d at 642-43, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803-04.
316. See id. at 527-30, 917 P.2d at 646-48, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 807-09.
317. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). In Jackson the Supreme Court
ruled that, in federal habeus corpus proceedings, the judge must review the records
from state proceedings and determine whether the evidence "could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." /d. at 318. In the event that the
standard has not been satisfied, the conviction must be reversed. See id. at 317.
318. See supra notes 297-99 and accompanying text. See generally Thornbury, supra note 13 (discussing ambiguity in the " three-strikes" law as a result of poor
draftsmanship).
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ognize that the judiciary has power to strike prior convictions used
327
for sentence enhancements, but only if the prosecutor consents.
Both sections give the prosecutor complete control over dismissin~
3
prior convictions after the decision to prosecute has been made.
Finally, each provision requires judges to "bargain" with prosecutors
329
in order to exercise their discretion to strike prior convictions.
Prior to Romero a number of California courts of appeal considered whether "three strikes" violated the separation-of-powers
doctrine. No court found such a violation. 330 In those cases, as well
as in Romero, the state argued that "three strikes" limits prosecuterial discretion and does not aggrandize prosecutorial power over the
judiciary. This was because subsection 667(g) forces prosecutors to
plead and prove all known prior felony convictions and d9es not allow prosecutors to enter a plea agreement to strike or seek dismissal
of prior felonies. 331 The only power to dismiss is found in subsection
667(f)~2) which requires prosecutors to seek dismissal from the
court. 3 2 Hence, unlike the situation in Tenorio, prosecutorial discretion is not arbitrary and unreviewable.333
327. See People v. Superior Court (Romero) , 13 Cal. 4th 497, 513, 917 P.2d 628,
636, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789, 797 (1996).
328. See id. at 514,917 P.2d at 637,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 798. In Davis v. Municipal
Court, 46 Cal. 3d 64,757 P.2d 11, 249 Cal. Rptr. 300 {1988), the California Supreme
Court upheld a statute which permitted the district attorney to decide whether to
prosecute a defendant or to allow that defendant to enter a diversion program. In
distinguishing the statute at issue in this case from those statutes before the court in
Tenorio, Esteybar, and On Tai Ho, the court declared that:
when a district attorney is given a role during the "judicial phase" of a
criminal proceeding, such role will violate the separation-of-powers doctrine if it accords the district attorney broad, discretionary decision making
authority to countermand a judicial determination . . . . [D]istrict attorney(s] (do not] improperly exercise(]"judicial authoritt' in violation of the
separation-of-powers doctrine when (they] exercise[] [their] traditional
broad discretion, before charges are filed , to decide what charges ought to
be prosecuted, even when that charging decision affects the defendant's
eligibility for diversion.
/d. at 85, 757 P.2d at 23, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 311-12.
329. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 512, 917 P.2d at 635, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 796.
330. See People v. Glaster, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1910, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65 (1995);
People v. Gore, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1396, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (1995); People v. Bailey,
46 Cal. App. 4th 743, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205 (1995); People v. Petty, 46 Cal. App. 4th
723, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34 (1995); People v. Superior Ct. (Romero), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d
364 (Ct. App. 1995), affd in part, rev'd in part, 13 Cal. 4th 497, 917 P.2d 628, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 789 {1996).
331. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667(g) {West Supp. 1997).
332. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 514, 917 P.2d at 636-37, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 797-98.
. 333. In People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d 89, 473 P.2d 993, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249, the statute
In question provided that no prior conviction "may be dismissed by the court or
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The state also argued that Tenorio was inapplicable in light of
events occurring subsequent to that decision.334 In Tenorio the court
stated that "even if the Legislature could constitutionally remove
335
the power to strike priors from the courts, it has not done so."
Since then, the legislature has limited judicial power to strike prior
felony convictions on several occasions, and state courts have upheld these actions.336 Thus, the state argued, because trial courts do
not have unfettered discretion to strike priors today, one of the key
aspects of Tenorio was missing: prosecutors under subsection
667(f)(2) did not interfere with an unfettered judicial power.
Romero correctly rejected these arguments. With regard to the
first argument, the court found that the trial and appellate courts
misread Tenorio. In Tenorio the court rejected a similar argument
and found that section 11718 could not be characterized as a limitation on prosecutorial discretion: "It is no answer to suggest that this
is but a lesser included portion of the prosecutor's discretion to
forego prosecution, as the decision to forego prosecution does not
337
itself deprive persons of liberty. " Tenorio's discussion of the arbitrary and unreviewable nature of executive power was not an argument that focused on the extent of the executive's power. Instead,
the evil in section 11718 was that judges were unable to act without
prosecutorial approval.338 As the supreme court observed, the Attorney General and the prosecution missed that point.339
The state's second argument in Romero was a nonsequitur.
There is no question that the legislature can limit judicial power.
For exa~le, the legislature can prevent courts from striking prior
felonies. That power flows from a different separation-of-powers
argument-that "in our tripartite system of government it is the
function of the legislative branch to define crimes and prescribe
stricken from the accusatory pleading except upon motion of the district attorney."
!d. at 94, 473 P.2d at 995, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
334. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 515, 917 P.2d at 637,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 798.
335. Tenorio , 3 Cal. 3d at 94, 473 P.2d at 996, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
336. See, e.g., People v. McKissick, 151 Cal. App. 3d 439, 199 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1984)
(upholding prohibition against judicial striking of gun-use allegation to allow a grant
of probation). In this regard subsection 1385(b) explicitly disallows judges from
striking prior felony convictions under section 667.
337. Tenorio , 3 Cal. 3d at 94, 473 P.2d at 996, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
338. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 512, 917 P.2d at 635, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 796
(stating that "to require the prosecutor's consent to the disposition of a criminal
charge pending before the court unacceptably compromises judicial independe nce").
339. See id. at 513-14, 917 P.2d at 636-37, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797-98.
340. See id. at 513, 917 P.2d at 636,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797.
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punishments."341 Since Tenorio the legislature has exercised its
342
authority to limit the power of courts to strike prior felonies. This
appears consistent with the allocation of power between the judicial
and legislative branches. Thus, the legislature can prevent either
branch from striking prior offenses. That was the effect of subsection 1385(b).343
Tenorio , however, was concerned with the allocation of power
between the judiciary and the executive. In limiting the court's discretion, the legislature cannot condition the use of judicial discretion
on the approval of the prosecutor. 344 In other words, Tenorio requires, and Romero merely reaffirms, that if prior felonies are to be
struck at all, the court must be able to raise the issue on its own motion.
Such a result makes sense in light of the policies underlying the
separation-of-powers doctrine. Prosecutors make decisions that are
largely unreviewable and out of public view.345 While prosecutors
serve the interests of justice, they also serve an advocacy function. 346
Entrusting them with unreviewable discretion concerning whether
striking prior felonies furthers the interests of justice limits the ability of the adversary system to educate the decision. By comparison,
judges make decisions in open court after both advocates have addressed the issue. Judges, more so than advocates, act in further347
ance of justice; such action is synonymous with judging.
Despite public criticism of the California Supreme Court, examination of the Romero decision suggests that the result was justi-

341. In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 917, 519 P.2d 1073, 1076, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649, 652
(1974) (quoting In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410,414,503 P.2d 921,923,105 Cal. Rptr. 217,
219 (1973)).
342. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
343. See CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1385(b) (West Supp. 1997).
344. See Tenorio , 3 Cal. 3d at 94-95, 473 P.2d at 996-97, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 252-53.
345. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§
13.3 (1984) (commenting that under the separation-of-powers doctrine, generally,
"courts are not to interfere with (the] exercise of discretion by the executive branch
of government" (citing Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973)); see also Peek v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1970)
(concluding that the Attorney General could not be compelled by mandamus to
prosecute suspected civil rights violators); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir. 1965) (stating that courts are not to interfere with the discretionary powers of
United States attorneys in their control over criminal prosecutions).
346. See Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d at 94, 473 P.2d at 995, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
347. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCf Canon 3(8) (1990) ("A judge shall
dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently and fairly.").
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fied. The constitution provides for a separation of powers348 that is
349
widely accepted as an important aspect of democratic govemment.
350
While the court engaged in some strained statutory analysis, it did
so explicitly to avoid conflict between the separation-of-powers
351
clause and the legislation. The clear message was that a contrary
reading of "three strikes" would have violated the state constitution.
The latter conclusion is unassailable: reliance on precedent dictated
352
that result.
IV. RESTORING DEMOCRACY
Critics of the federal judiciary often argue that federal courts
are antidemocratic.353 But that is by design. The Framers of the
Constitution saw virtue in an independent federal judiciary!54 No
doubt, there are times when popular sentiment should be resisted

348. See CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3 ("The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may
not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.").
349. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§§ 2-4, at 21-22
(2d ed. 1988) (recognizing that " no complex society can have its centers of power not
'offset against each other as checks,' and resist tyranny"); see also Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The purpose [of the doctrine of separation of powers] was, not to avoid friction ... incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, [but] to save the people
from autocracy.").
350. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
351. The California Supreme Court declared that if it adopted the state's construction of the statute, "the statute would appear to violate the doctrine of separation of powers." Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 513, 917 P.2d at 636, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797.
The court considered many possible statutory interpretations of the " three-strikes"
law and rejected all of them. See id. at 517-32,917 P.2d at 639-49, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
800-10.

352. See supra notes 320-44 and accompanying text.
353. See generally BORK, supra note 31, at 351 (warning that the " politicization"
of the federal judiciary was encouraging judges "on to still greater incursions into
Americans' right to self-government"); ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL
CuLTURES 25 (1989) (arguing that the unchecked, stringent enforcement of constitutional rights by the federal judiciary " may in fact undermine the capacity for durable
constitutional government"); CHARLES RICE, LEGALIZING HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT:
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1984)
(expressing concern that federal decisions regarding homosexual rights demonstrate
an increasing judicial supremacy over state law).
354. James Madison, quoting from Montesquieu, wrote in support of an independent judiciary: "'Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary controul [sic], for the judge
would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might
behave with all the violence of an oppressor."' THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 338
(James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed. 1966).
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and courts should uphold principle over popular will. At times,
separation of powers and judicial independence may be antidemocratic. Arguably, this is one of the virtues of our system. 355
This Article has argued, though, that in the case of "three
strikes," the California Supreme Court's decision in Romero was not
antidemocratic. Many factors have combined to prevent rational
debate about the law: the combination of public and media hysteria
over the Klaas killing;356 the political opportunism of elected officials;357 the failure of other politicians to voice objections;358 the
power politics of victims' rights advocates armed with money from
359
the prison-industrial complex; the absence of any measures requiring voters to decide how they want to pay for the prison construction
required by "three strikes";360 and misstatements in campaign litera361
ture supporting Proposition 184.
The electorate was not asked, for example, whether it wanted to
incarcerate a two-time burglar past the peak of his criminal career
for twenty-five years to life when his third felony was for possession
of crack cocaine or whether it wanted similar penalties for two-time
felons convicted of possession of marijuana. Consistent with Rublic
opinion surveys362 and Proposition 184 campaign literature, 63 the
355. See MaxwellS. Pfeifer, Unwarranted Attacks on Judges Must End, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 26, 1996, at 2 ("An independent judiciary is essential to our democratic society
and is to be treasured and protected."); Thomas C. Platt, Insuring an Independent
Judiciary, N.Y. L.J., July 8, 1996, at 2 ("[A]n independent judiciary is the cornerstone
of good government."); see also Merritt, supra note 33, at All (arguing that as newly
democratic countries, such as Russia and those of Eastern Europe, strive to obtain
the same liberties as Americans, they are using the American judicial system, but not
its executive or legislative branches, as a model).
356. See supra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
358. See supra Part II.E.
359. See supra Part II.B.
360. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text (discussing the ballot initiative); see also Ronald F. Wright, Three Strikes Initiative and Sinking Fund Proposal,
FED. SENTENCING REP., Sept./Oct. 1995, at 80 (noting that most state corrections
budgets will not feel the immense impact of "three strikes" until several years from
now, Law Professor Ronald F. Wright observed that " the remoteness in time of the
costs of Three Strikes laws gives legislators a powerful reason to discount those costs .
. . . The long time frame makes the cost seem politically irrelevant and easy to ignore.").
361. See supra Part II.G.
· 362. See generally Joseph W. Queen & William Murphy, Race Doesn't Dictate
Politics, NEWSDAY, Apr. 26, 1996, at 29 (reporting that 82% of the public favor life
sentences under the " three-strikes" law for those convicted of three violent felonies).
363. See California Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 2, at 36 ("3 Strikes keeps career
criminals, who rape women, molest innocent children and commit murder, behind

1702

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:1643

electorate wanted long prison sentences for murderers, rapists, and
other violent felons. One noted commentator suggests that many
California citizens might not approve of the broad sweep of "three
strikes. " 364
Reforming "three strikes" in the legislature would have been
difficult. Prior to Romero, State Senate President Pro Tern Bill
Lockyer appeared ready to attempt reform by withholding legislation to fund new prisons that would be made necessary by "three
strikes" unless its scope was narrowed.365 Whether those efforts
would have succeeded is unclear. Perhaps not fully understood by
the electorate, use of the initiative process makes legislative reform
extremely difficult. The legislature cannot amend initiatives unless
the amendment is approved by the voters, or unless the original initiative provides otherwise; the "three-strikes" initiative permitted
legislative amendment by requiring a two-thirds approval by each
366
house.
"Three strikes" also included a technical provision that voters
almost certainly would not have fully appreciated. Subsection
667(h) provides that "[ a]ll references to existing statutes in subdivisions ~! to (g), inclusive, are to statutes as they existed on June 30,
1993."
The effect of this provision is to prevent the legislature
from removing offenses from the list of serious or violent felonies.
In other words, it cuts off one area of legislative reform, for example, by removing burglary from the list of prior offenses that may
count as a strike.
Romero has given the legislature a second opportunity to correct the excesses of "three strikes." It is unclear, however, whether
this will occur.

bars where they belong.").
364. Professor Franklin Zimring believes that public support for "three strikes" is
mixed. See Goldberg, supra note 26, at Al. Although the public widely supports the
law applied to violent repeat offenders, Professor Zimring estimates that 80% of the
public is opposed to applying "three strikes" to minor offenses, such as stealing a
piece of pizza. See id.
365. See Andy Furillo, 'Three Strikes' Collides with California's Bursting Prisons,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 2,1996, at Al.
366 See CAL. CONST. art. 2, § lO(c); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(j) (West Supp.
1997). Romero's critics fail to acknowledge that requiring a supermajority to reform
bad legislation is itself antidemocratic. See generally supra note 30 and accompanying text (providing criticism of the Romero decision as being antidemocratic).
367. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667(h).
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Immediately after Romero, commentators differed over the ef69
fect of the decision. 368 Despite some misleading headlines/
370
Romero leaves intact key provisions of the law. That judges may
exercise discretion to strike prior felonies does not mean that they
will routinely do so. Some commentators argued that judges would
use that power infrequently in light of two facts. First, most judges
currently serving are Wilson and Deukmejian appointees-not
likely to be the liberal judges so feared by the proponents of "three
strikes." 37 1 Second, even liberal judges understand the public's desire for long prison terms for repeat offenders.372
An examination of the data of "three-strikes" cases during the
first two years of its application reveals a contrary argument-that
discretion may result in judges avoiding application of "three
strikes" in a large number of cases.373 For example, application of
"three strikes" has occurred in far more cases involving marijuana
use than in cases involving violent felons.374 Violent felonies are a

368. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
369. See, e.g., Claire Cooper, "3 Strikes" Provision Tossed Out, SACRAMENTO
BEE, June 21 , 1996, at Al; Christopher Reed, 'Three Strikes' Law Is Ruled Out by
Judges, THE GUARDIAN, June 22, 1996, at 14.
370. Since the court did not decide Romero on constitutional grounds but rather
upon strict statutory interpretation, judges can still issue maximum sentences as outlined by "three strikes." See Burden of Proof (CNN television broadcast, June 24,
1996), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (discussing how the very narrow discretion now afforded to judges actually supports the sentencing required by
" three strikes" ).
Criminal law expe rts, including academics, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, stress that the Romero ruling is narrow in scope. See Dan Berstein, Judges
Seem Unlikely to Undo 'Three Strikes', SACRAMENTO BEE, July 1, 1996, at A8; see
also Burden of Proof, supra (quoting Los Angeles County Deputy Public Defender
Alex Ricciardulli and Attorney General Dan Lungren's disagreement with the cohost's assertion that Romero "gutted" " three strikes").
371. See John Jacobs, Editorial, More Posturing on 'Three Strikes', SACRAMENTO
BEE, June 30, 1996, at F4 (noting that Republican Governors Deukmejian and Wilson have appointed every judge over the past fourteen years and that most judges
independently elected to the bench since then have been former prosecutors).
372. See Krikorian & Morain, supra note 33, at A1 (discussing that judges will exercise their discretion only in limited circumstances because they recognize the need
for criminal incarceration); see also Dan Morain, Ruling May Force '3 Strikes' Backers to Dilute Law, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1996, at A3 (quoting Senator Lockyer's
statement that "most of the judges won't strike priors" ).
373. See Front-Line Fights Over 3 Strikes, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1996, at AI (citing
Los Angeles County statistics which indicate that a third strike is most likely to be a
drug offense; specifically, 28% of third strikes were for drug crimes, and 10% involved petty thefts).
374. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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375

small part of the total number of felonies committed.
Hence, in
many, if not most cases, judges will be faced with defendants accused of having committed nonviolent third strikes. As in Romero a
judge may be tempted to accept a glea bargain for a felon whose final strike involves drug possession. 6
A. S.B. 331: Undoing Romero
Despite a lack of evidence of Romero's impact,m Assembly
Speaker Curt Pringle and Senate Majority Leader Rob Hurtt pro378
posed a response to the decision.
Authored by Hurtt, S.B. 331
would have added a new subsection to section 1385.379 As proposed,
subsection 1385(c) would have severely limited the exercise of a
judge's discretion. A judge could "strike" a prior felony only if
three conditions were met: (1) none of the defendant's prior felony
convictions was for a violent crime; (2) the current charge is neither
violent nor serious; and (3) the defendant has not committed a prior
felonrs during the last five years that such defendant was not in custody. 80
S.B. 331 also would have added language to subsection 667(g)
allowing the prosecutor to decide not to charge a prior felony conviction, subject to a requirement that the prosecutor notify the court
of all prior felony convictions and explain the decision not to charge
381
An amended subsection 667(f) would have
those prior felonies.
specified the legislature's intent that prior convictions should be
pled and proven except in unusual circumstances.382
375. According to the 1994 crime index, violent felonies accounted for 13.3% of
total felonies in 1994. See CRIME IN THE U.S. 1994, supra note 240, at 8 chart 2.3.
376. See People v. Superior Court (Romero) , 13 Cal. 4th 497,506-07, 917 P.2d 628,
631-32,53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789, 792-93 (1996).
377. See ' Three Strikes' Discretion, FRESNO BEE, June 22, 1996, at B6 (suggesting
that a far wiser course than immediate legislative response would be to wait and see
how significant the consequences of Romero will be).
378. See Sweeney, supra note 278, at 5 (noting that Pringle and Hurtt formed a
coalition of "three-strikes" supporters to draft a legislative response to Romero).
379. See S.B. 331, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE§
1385).
380. See id.
381. See id.; see also Dan Goodin, New 'Three Strikes' Bill Could Put Heat on
Hallinan , RECORDER (San Francisco), July 9, 1996, at 4 (noting that the provisions in
S.B. 331 are designed to put political heat on district attorneys who aren 't aggressive
in applying "three strikes").
382. See Cal. S.B. 331 (providing the following as not sufficient reasons for a
prosecutor to decline to plead and prove a prior felony conviction: (1) disagreement
with subsections 667(b)-(i), the "three-strikes" legislation; (2) plea bargaining, ex-
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Mike Reynolds and Secretary of State Bill Jones touted S.B.
331 because they believe Romero is "thwarting the will of the people. " 383 Despite their support and Senator Hurtt's threat of political
reprisal, S.B. 331 failed in the Senate.384 While it passed through the
assembly with overwhelming bipartisan support, only one member
of the Senate Criminal Procedure Committee voted in favor of the
bill.385
The Senate Committee's action reflects the change in the political climate since passage of A.B. 971 and Proposition 184. Some
legislators were finally focusing on some of the realities of "three
strikes." In the two years since its passage, its draFnet effect on
38
nonviolent felons has become increasingly obvious.
The issue of
paying for prisons, conveniently put off during passage of A.B. 971,
387
has come front and center. Legislators know they must act soon to
find massive funding for prison construction if we are to have
388
enough cells to warehouse the projected prison population.
Reflecting the new climate, Senator Lockyer opposed S.B. 331 because,
like "three strikes," it was a "waste of taxpayer money directed at
389
imposing life imprisonment on petty criminals."

B. A.B. 2122: A More Moderate Proposal
390
Assemblyman Phil Isenberg, now a victim of term limits, in391
troduced A.B. 2122 in August, 1996. A.B. 2122 died in the Senate
392
Criminal Procedure Committee. As amended during the summer,
cept in unusual circumstances; or (3) a perceived need for reduction of case loads).
383. Vincent Schiraldi, Three Strikes, Reprise, RECORDER (San Francisco), Aug.
28, 1996, at 4. Buc see id. (arguing that the will of the people cannot be frustrated
because no one asked the voters to choose between a " three-strikes" bill that would
provide for judicial discretion in nonviolent cases and one that did not).
384. See Sweeney, supra note 278, at 5 (noting the sole vote in favor was from the
committee's only Republican member).
385. See id.
386. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
387. See Vitiello, supra note 2, at 452-53 & nn. 332-36, 458 & nn 359-60.
388. See id.
389. Sweeney, supra note 278, at 5.
390. See Ed Mendel, Legislatures Coming to Terms with Their Limits, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Sept. 9, 1996, at A3.
391. A.B. 2122, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE§§
667, 1170.12).
392. Legislators chose not to move ahead with A.B. 2122 before the close of the
1995-1996 Regular Session. See Dana Wilke, Democrats Seem Slow to Revamp
Three-Strikes Law, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 20, 1996, at A3. Instead, thesession ended with the bill sitting idle in the Senate Criminal Procedure Committee.
See 1 ASSEMBLY RECESS HISTORY, 629 (Cal. 1995-1996 Reg. Sess., Oct 7, 1996)
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it would have limited a judge's discretion only in cases involving a
third strike that was a serious or violent felony. 393 A.B. 2122 would
394
have left section 1385 intact.
The Isenberg bill would have had a similar effect as the original
Rainey bill: enhanced sentences would have been mandated onl~
for those felons whose third strike was at least a serious felony. 3 5
But A.B. 2122 would still have allowed a judge to impose penalties
under "three strikes" for other felons.
C. Save "Three Strikes" Public Safety Act of1998: Another
Initiative
After the Senate Criminal Procedure Committee voted down
S.B. 331, Mike Reynolds filed a new initiative. Both the CDAA and
the California Correctional Peace Officers Association supported
396
the initiative. Draft No. 6, revised on August 2, 1996, would impose limits on judicial discretion similar to those proposed in S.B.
331.397

Like S.B. 331, a judge may strike a prior felony only if three
398
conditions are met. The first two are the same as those in S.B. 331,
namely, that none of the prior convictions was for a violent felony
and the current charge must be neither a serious nor violent felony.399 Even more severe is the third cumulative requirement, that
the defendant not have committed a prior serious felony in at least
ten years while not in custody. 400 Also modeled on S.B. 331 is the
provision that allows a prosecutor discretion not to charge a prior
felony but requires the prosecutor to file a notice with the court
enumerating the felonies and explaining the basis of the decision not
(listing history of A.B. 2122).
393. See Cal. A.B. 2122 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1170.12(f)).
394. Rather than amend section 1385, A.B. 2122 sought to limit judicial discretion
by amending the original "three-strike" legislation. See id.
395. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
396. See Pamela J. Podger, Reynolds Pushes 'Save Three Strikes' Initiative,
FRESNO BEE, Oct. 3, 1996, at 81 (citing Larry Brown, who heads the CDAA, as saying that the initiative surpasses legislative fixes and that prosecutors may help raise
money for the proposed initiative).
397. See Save "Three Strikes" Public Safety Act of 1998, at 8 (Aug. 2, 1996) (fax of
Draft No. 6 received by the CDAA) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law

Review).
398. See id. at 9.
399. See id. at 9-11 (proposing amendments to CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1385); supra
note 396 and accompanying text (detailing S.B. 331's requirements for judicial discretion).
400. See Save "Three Strikes" Public Safety Act of 1998, supra note 397, at 9.
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401

V. CONCLUSION: RESTORING THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
Despite numerous attacks on the supreme court that Romero
violated the will of the people,402 the court did no such thing. As developed above, "three strikes" passed amidst public and media hysteria. Its passage was marred by opportunism by some politicians
and by a lack of courage of others. 40 Victims' rights groups, backed
by money from organizations benefiting from the prison construc404
tion boom, dominated the debate over "three strikes." Even Marc
Klaas's defection could not slow passage of "three strikes," absent
meaningful opposition. 405 Campaign literature supporting Proposition 184 underscores how skewed the debate was: It promised to
lead to the incarceration of murderers, rapists, and child molesters
but failed to mention that California citizens also would have to pay
for long incarceration of two-time felons convicted for possession of
narcotics.406
The drafters of A.B. 971 attempted to protect "three strikes" by
including a provision requiring a supermajority to amend its provisions.407 That provision now requires proponents of "three strikes"
to compromise if they want to secure passage of legislation.
As discussed above, Romero has given the legislature the opportunity for rational debate that was lacking when A.B. 971 sailed
408
through the legislature in 1994. Since that time, Polly Klaas's killer has been convicted and sentenced to death. 409 The public now
410
has less concern about crime.
News reports of some of the excesses of "three strikes" seem to have brought to the public the rec-

401. See id. at 8 (proposing amendments to CAL. PENAL CODE ~
1170.12(d)(2)(8)).
402. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 99-104, 145-78 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 107-23 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
406. See supra notes 203-46 and accompanying text.
407. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 353-76 and accompanying text.
409. See Mary Curtius, Klaas Killer Sentenced to Die, Stuns Court, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 1996, at Al.
410. See Celinda Lake, Voters Want Action on Crime, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 1994,
at 11A (reporting that crime was voters' top concern in 1994). But see Clinton Denies Tobacco Curbs Are Diversion from Drug Stars, USA TODAY, Aug. 23, 1996, at
6A (illustrating decline in voters' concern about crime). In 1996 crime was the voters' third concern, ranked behind education and the economy. See id.
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ognition that "three strikes" was not quite what it was advertised to
411
be.
Concern among some minority communities-traditional
Democratic constituencies-has given Democratic politicians incentive to temper "three strikes. " 412 If the legislature returns to
"three strikes" as a result of Romero, in light of post-1994 developments and the need to achieve a two-thirds majority, the chance of
rational reform of its excesses increases.
Less certain is the initiative process. There, the most ardent
supEorters of "three strikes" need only a majority of the electorate. 13 But the forces that combined to silence opposition to "three
strikes" may not be able to prevail a second time. In 1994 no politician was willing to take a visible, principled stand against A .B. 971
414
or Proposition 184. Since then, as indicated above, the public has
begun to recognize the excesses of "three strikes," and its opponents
415
have regained some visibility. In an atmosphere less polluted by
fear and anticrime hysteria, the electorate may focus on the economic arguments. Public debate on achieving similar reductions in
crime for significantly less money may hit home as it did not during
the original campaign for "three strikes. "416
At this point, one can only speculate whether Reynolds's new
initiative will qualify for the ballot, and, if it does, whether it will
pass. But only because of Romero do California citizens have the
opportunity to debate "three strikes" a second time, hopefully, more
dispassionately than in 1994.

411. Editorials have heightened public awareness of the defects of " three strikes"
by detailing individual cases of shocking punishme nts. See A Return of Judgment to
the Judging Process, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1996, at 88 (recounting the pizza thief who
was incarcerated for life); see also Judicious Decision, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June
23, 1996, at 04 (discussing the same case); Furthering Justice, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., June 22, 1996, at 86 (stating that twice as many defendants receive tough sente nces for marijuana possession than for violent crime).
412. See Vitiello, supra note 2, at 455-57 & nn. 347-53.
413. See CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 10(a) (requiring a majority vote of the electorate for
passage of an initiative).
414. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
415. See supra note 412 and accompanying text.
416. See supra Part 11.1.

